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COMMERCE
Jack M. Balkin *
This Article applies the method of text and principle to an important
problem in constitutional interpretation: the constitutional legitimacy
of the modem regulatory state and its expansive definition of federal
commerce power Some originalists argue that the modem state can-
not be justified, while others accept existing precedents as a
"pragmatic exception" to originalism. Nonoriginalists, in turn, point
to these difficulties as a refutation of originalist premises.
Contemporary originalist readings have tended to view the com-
merce power through modem eyes. Originalists defending narrow
readings offederal power have identified "commerce" with the trade
of commodities; originalists defending broad readings of federal
power have identified "commerce" with all gainful economic activ-
ity. In the eighteenth century, however "commerce" did not have
such narrowly economic connotations. Instead, "commerce" meant
"intercourse" and it had a strongly social connotation. "Commerce"
was interaction and exchange between persons or peoples. To have
commerce with someone meant to converse with them, meet with
them, or interact with them. Thus, commerce naturally included all
trade and economic activity because economic activity was social ac-
tivity. But the idea of commerce-as-intercourse was broader than
economics narrowly conceived-it also included networks of trans-
portation and communication through which people traveled,
interacted, and corresponded with each other
Understanding "commerce" in its original sense of "intercourse"
is consistent with all of the evidence offered by rival theories of
commerce as trade or economic activity; but it better explains the
source of Congress's powers over immigration and foreign affairs.
It also better explains Congress's broad powers over transportation
and communications networks, whether or not these networks are
used for purposes of business or trade.
Congress's power to regulate commerce "among the several states"
is closely linked to the general structural purpose behind Con-
gress's enumerated powers as articulated by the Framers-to give
* Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law School. My
thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Akhil Amar, William Forbath, Calvin Johnson, Sanford Levinson, John
Witt, and participants at a faculty colloquium at the University of Texas School of Law for their
comments on a previous draft.
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Congress power to legislate in all cases where states are separately
incompetent or where the interests of the nation might be undermined
by unilateral or conflicting state action. Properly understood, the
commerce power authorizes Congress to regulate problems or activi-
ties that produce spillover effects between states or generate
collective action problems that concern more than one state.
This basic structural principle explains why Congress's commerce
power inevitably expanded with the rise of a modern integrated
economy and society, and it explains and justifies most if not all of
modern doctrine. This approach justifies the constitutionality of
federal regulation of labor law, consumer protection law, environ-
mental law, and antidiscrimination law; it even shows why a
federal mandate for individuals to purchase health insurance is
constitutional. Finally, this approach shows why there are still ar-
eas where federal commerce power does not extend-these are
areas where Congress cannot reasonably claim that an activity
produces interstate spillovers or collective action problems, and
does not involve networks of transportation and communication.
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INTRODUCTION:
ORIGINAL MEANING AND THE MODERN STATE
A good test for the plausibility of any theory of constitutional interpreta-
tion is how well it handles the doctrinal transformations of the New Deal
period. Roughly between 1937 and 1942, the Supreme Court significantly
altered the law of federal-state relations, including the federal power to
regulate commerce and to tax and spend for the general welfare.
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The doctrinal structure that emerged by the mid-1940s was drastically
different from the expectations of the founding generation. Even the most
stridently nationalist members of that generation would not have expected a
federal government as powerful as the one that developed in the middle of
the twentieth century. It now had a robust regulatory and welfare state with
jurisdiction over federal health and safety laws, laws protecting the envi-
ronment, laws securing the rights of workers, and a panoply of federal civil
rights guarantees. Without the New Deal transformation in constitutional
understandings about national power, we could not have a federal govern-
ment that provides all of the social services and statutory rights guarantees
that Americans have come to expect. The government could neither act to
protect the environment nor rescue the national economy in times of crisis.
The rise of the modern state poses a problem for originalist theories of
constitutional interpretation. Some originalists, like Justice Antonin Scalia
(or Judge Robert Bork) have simply accepted the New Deal as settled even
though they believe it is inconsistent with original meaning.' Justice Scalia
has called his acceptance of nonoriginalist precedents a "pragmatic" excep-
tion to originalism.2 Other originalists, like Justice Clarence Thomas,
Randy Barnett,4 and Richard Epstein,' refuse to make the same concessions
to current political realities; they regard significant parts of the New Deal
and the legislation that followed it as unconstitutional. For them, the ques-
tion is how best to transition to a federal government that stays within its
proper constitutional limits.
By contrast, Bruce Ackerman, a vigorous defender of the New Deal,
agrees that it is inconsistent with the Founders' Constitution.' He explains the
legitimacy of the New Deal by arguing that starting in 1936, the American
people had a quasi-revolutionary "constitutional moment," which actually
amended the Constitution outside of the Article V amendment process.
1. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 37 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Ro-
BERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw 158-59
(1990); Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. pt. 1, 112-13, 264-65, 292-93,
465 (1987), reprinted in 14 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS
ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 1916-1987, at 292-93, 444-45, 472-73, 645 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron
Jacobstein eds., 1990) (testimony of Robert H. Bork, Sept. 15, 1987-Sept. 19, 1987); Antonin Sca-
lia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861-64 (1989); Philip Lacovara, A Talk
with Judge Robert H. Bork, DISTRICT LAW., May/June 1985, at 29, 32.
2. Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 129, 140 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); id. at 139 ("The whole function of the doctrine [of
stare decisis] is to make us say that what is false under proper analysis must nonetheless be held to
be true, all in the interest of stability.").
3. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
4. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIB-
ERTY 317-18, 348-53 (2004).
5. Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387
(1987).
6. BRUCE ACKERMAN: I WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1998).
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I reject each of these approaches. In a series of articles, I have argued
that the opposition between originalism and living constitutionalism is a
false dichotomy. Constitutional interpretation requires fidelity to the origi-
nal meaning of the text and to the principles stated by the text or that
underlie the text. But fidelity to original meaning does not require fidelity to
the original expected applications of text and principle. This approach,
which I call the method of text and principle, is faithful to the original
meaning of the constitutional text and to its underlying purposes. It is also
consistent with a basic law whose reach and application evolve over time, a
basic law that delegates to each generation the task of implementing the
Constitution's words and principles. In each generation the American people
are charged with implementing text and principle in their own time, through
building political institutions, passing legislation, and creating precedents,
both judicial and nonjudicial. These constitutional constructions, in turn,
shape how succeeding generations will understand and apply the Constitu-
tion in their time. That is the best way to understand the interpretive
practices of our constitutional tradition and the work of the many political
and social movements that have transformed our understandings of the Con-
stitution's guarantees. The present Article applies this approach to the
question of federal power in the modem administrative and regulatory state;
it shows how to use the traditional modalities of legal argument to articulate
and flesh out the constitutional text and its underlying principles.
I disagree both with originalists and with their critics because I do not
believe that the New Deal is inconsistent with the Constitution's original
meaning, its text, or its underlying principles. Therefore there is no need to
make an exception for it, "pragmatic" or otherwise. Nor did the transition to
the modem state require an Article V amendment; and therefore it also did
not require an amendment outside of Article V. Rather, the New Deal, while
preserving the Constitution's original meaning, featured a series of new con-
stitutional constructions by the political branches that were eventually
ratified by the federal judiciary." Although the scope of the change was lar-
7. See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 Nw. U. L.
REV. 549, 549-60 (2009) (arguing that fidelity to original meaning requires fidelity to Framers'
choice of rules, standards, and principles to organize politics, but not to how they would have ap-
plied abstract principles or vague language in concrete circumstances); Jack M. Balkin, Original
Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CoNsT. COMMENT. 427, 432-36 (2007) (advocating a
method of "text and principle" that distinguishes between original meaning and original expected
applications); Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONsT. COMMENT. 291, 292-307
(2007) (same). These articles develop the basic theory of constitutional interpretation applied in this
Article.
8. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, supra note 7, at 560-63. On
the idea of constitutional construction, see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUC-
TION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 5 (1999); see also KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (1999). Whittington defines constitutional interpretation as the "process of dis-
covering the meaning of the constitutional text," while constitutional construction is "essentially
creative, though the foundations for the ultimate structure are taken as given. The text is not dis-
carded but brought into being." Id. at 5. Although Whittington's original theory of construction
assumed that only the political branches engaged in construction, Randy Barnett has pointed out that
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ger than in most doctrinal transformations, the New Deal is actually a fairly
standard example of how new constitutional constructions displace older
ones.
The impetus for changed understandings came not from the courts but
from the political branches, who led and responded to political mobiliza-
tions for change. The federal courts, attuned to an older way of thinking,
and seeking to preserve older constructions, resisted at first. However, the
public strongly supported the president and Congress, who continued to
press for a different understanding of the Constitution. The courts, increas-
ingly stocked with allies of the president, eventually followed popular
opinion, legitimating the new constitutional constructions in a series of
landmark decisions.9
But this simply raises the question: How is the modem regulatory and
administrative state consistent with the original meaning of the constitu-
tional text? In this Article, I focus on the most important source of authority
for the modem state: the Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8, which
provides that "[t]he Congress shall have the power. . . . [t]o regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes."'o I will not be able to discuss all of the issues raised by the
Commerce Clause in this Article; instead I will touch only on basic features
that are central to the legitimacy of the regulatory state.
Whether they defend a broad or narrow conception of federal authority,
contemporary originalist readings have tended to view the commerce power
through modern eyes. Originalists defending narrow readings of federal
power have identified "commerce" with the trade of commodities;"
originalists defending broad readings of federal power have identified
"commerce" with all gainful economic activity.12 In the eighteenth century,
however, "commerce" did not have such narrowly economic connotations.
Instead, "commerce" meant "intercourse" and it had a strongly social con-
notations. "Commerce" was interaction and exchange between persons or
peoples. To have commerce with someone meant to converse with them,
meet with them, or interact with them. Thus, commerce naturally included
all trade and economic activity because economic activity was social activ-
ity. Defenders of commercial activity in the eighteenth century emphasized
its sociality: they argued that commercial intercourse generated peace, fos-
tered social cooperation, and ultimately forged bonds of connection. But the
idea of commerce-as-intercourse was broader than economics narrowly con-
ceived-it also included networks of transportation and communication
judges also engage in constitutional construction through the development of constitutional doc-
trines that implement and give legal effect to the text. BARNETT, supra note 4, at 118-30.
9. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, supra note 7, at 575-85;
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan En-
trenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 489, 490-92 (2006).
10. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 44, 52-53.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 56-63.
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through which people traveled, interacted, and corresponded with each oth-
13
er.
Defining commerce in its original sense of "intercourse" is consistent
with all of the evidence offered by rival theories of commerce as trade or
economic activity, but it better explains the source of Congress's powers
over immigration and foreign affairs. It also better explains Congress's
broad powers over transportation and communications networks, whether or
not these networks are used for purposes of business or trade.14
Congress's power to regulate commerce "among the several states" is
closely linked to the general structural purpose of Congress's enumerated
powers as articulated by the Framers: to give Congress power to legislate in
all cases where states are separately incompetent or where the interests of
the nation might be undermined by unilateral or conflicting state action.
This structural principle underlies all of Congress's enumerated powers, and
we should interpret the commerce power accordingly. Properly understood,
the commerce power authorizes Congress to regulate problems or activities
that produce spillover effects between states or generate collective action
problems that concern more than one state.
This basic structural principle explains why Congress's commerce pow-
er inevitably expanded with the rise of a modem integrated economy and
society, and it explains and justifies most if not all of modem doctrine. In
particular, this approach justifies the constitutionality of federal regulation
of labor law, consumer protection law, environmental law, and anti-
discrimination law; it even shows why a federal mandate for individuals to
purchase health insurance is constitutional. Finally, this approach shows
why there are still areas where federal commerce power does not extend-
these are areas where Congress cannot reasonably claim that an activity
produces interstate spillovers or collective action problems, and does not
involve networks of transportation and communication.
I. A GOVERNMENT OF FEDERAL AND ENUMERATED POWERS
The text of the Commerce Clause has two noteworthy features. First, the
Commerce Clause is a clause-it forms one part of a very long extended
sentence, which lists (most of) the enumerated powers of Congress. Second,
the Commerce Clause uses the words "regulate" and "commerce" only
once; it then applies them to three different situations: with foreign nations,
with the Indian tribes, and among the several states. The same words-
"regulate commerce"-apply to each situation. So, if there is a difference in
Congress's constitutional powers with respect to foreign, Indian, and domes-
tic commerce, it does not stem from the original meaning of the words
"regulate" or "commerce." Rather, any differences in congressional power
13. See infra text accompanying notes 40-52.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 78-97, 106-109.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 36-37, 114.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 135-147.
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come from the difference between the words "with" and "among." For this
reason, Akhil Amar has remarked that we should really call the Commerce
Clause the "with-and-among clause." 7
Why does the text read this way? Why does it yoke foreign, Indian, and
interstate commerce together in a single clause, and why does it embed that
clause in a very long list of enumerated powers?
The text looks the way it does because a basic structural principle under-
lies the text, and in fact, the text was written precisely to articulate that
general principle. The Tenth Amendment, added in 1791, emphasizes that
the powers delegated by the people are less than a complete grant to the na-
tional government. It states that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people."" Chief Justice Stone once de-
scribed the Amendment as "but a truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered."' 9 But the Tenth Amendment is not a mere truism if it re-
flects a deeper structural principle underlying the text and its choice of
enumerated powers.
A note about structural arguments: When we interpret the Constitution,
we constantly make reference to structural principles, such as the separation
of powers, or the principle of checks and balances, or democratic self gov-
ernment, or the rule of law. These structural principles are special types of
constructions. They do not simply implement abstract principles already
announced in the text; rather, they explain how the Constitution works in
practice and how it should work.
Many of these structural principles were intended by people who drafted
the Constitution and they explained their ideas in debates about the Consti-
tution. We can use evidence of their reasoning to show that a structural
principle exists and that it should guide our interpretation of the Constitu-
tion. But we should not confuse structural principles with original
intentions. Structural principles do not have to have been intended by any-
one in particular; indeed, they may only become apparent over time as we
watch how the various elements of the constitutional system interact with
each other. Like Minerva's owl, people may recognize structural principles
in the Constitution only after the mechanisms have been working for some
time, or when they threaten to stop working properly and must be repaired
or redeemed.
Later constitutional amendments, subsequent constructions, and changes
in circumstances might make some of the Framers' assumptions about how
the Constitution would work obsolete. For example, the Framers did not
imagine a system of political parties, or a dominant presidency, much less
expect that the United States would someday be a world power with stand-
ing armies located around the globe. Americans had to figure out the
17. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 108 (2005).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. X.




structural principles that should apply (and how they should apply) given
those changed circumstances. The Seventeenth Amendment sought to give
the people greater control over the Senate. But it had structural conse-
quences that were not fully understood for many years. In fact, we might say
that structural arguments often arise when people disagree about whether
the constitutional machine is out of joint and they have to articulate how it
should work properly. If we try to ground structural principles solely in the
intentions of the Framers, we will miss many structural features of our Con-
stitution as it actually works in practice.
Many people who defend the modem administrative and regulatory state
following the New Deal probably think that the Framers' structural assump-
tions about limited and enumerated powers fall into the category of ancient
structural principles that have been thoroughly undermined. Perhaps they
suspect this because the people who want to shrink or overthrow the modem
state are always doing so in the name of the Framers. The latter tell us that if
we were faithful to the structural principles, we couldn't have anything like
the modern state.
But both sides are wrong. The defenders of the modem activist state
have given up too quickly on the text of the Constitution and its underlying
principles, while their opponents have confused ancient and outmoded con-
structions for the actual requirements of the constitutional framework. The
key structural principles underlying the list of enumerated powers in Article
I, Section 8 are still quite relevant today. Not only are they consistent with
the rise of the modem administrative and regulatory state, they also explain
and justify why that state came into being.
The basic principles underlying the list of enumerated powers were well
stated by one of the key Founders, James Wilson, in the Pennsylvania ratify-
ing convention in November of 1787:
Whatever object of government is confined, in its operation and effects,
within the bounds of a particular state, should be considered as belonging
to the government of that state; whatever object of government extends, in
its operation or effects, beyond the bounds of a particular state, should be
considered as belonging to the government of the United States.20
In saying this, Wilson was doing no more than summarizing the struc-
tural assumptions of the drafters in Philadelphia. The origins of Congress's
powers go back to the sixth of the resolutions prepared by the Virginia dele-
gation, led by James Madison and Edmund Randolph, and introduced at the
constitutional convention on May 29, 1787. These resolutions were collec-
tively called the Virginia plan. Resolution VI, introduced by Randolph,
stated that the new "National Legislature" would be empowered "to enjoy
the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation & moreover
to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in
which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise
20. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION As RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA 424
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT].
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of individual Legislation."2 1 The convention initially approved this language
on May 31st by a vote of nine in favor, none against, and one delegation
divided.22
Representing the interests of smaller states, William Paterson offered his
New Jersey plan on June 15, 1787, with a far weaker national government
and a smaller list of enumerated powers, including the power to "pass Acts
for the regulation of trade & commerce as well with foreign nations as with
each other."23 Comparing the two plans, Wilson explained that while under
the Virginia plan "the Natl. Legislature is to make laws in all cases at which
the separate States are incompetent," the New Jersey plan offered Congress
only a minor increase of the powers it enjoyed under the existing confedera-
tion. The convention reapproved the Virginia plan and rejected the New
Jersey plan on June 19th, by a vote of seven states to three, with one delega-
tion divided.2 5
On July 16th, after the so-called "Great Compromise" that gave the
small states equal representation in the Senate, the convention took up Reso-
lution VI once again. On the 17th, Roger Sherman of Connecticut, who had
been the only delegate to oppose Resolution VI in the original vote, moved
to amend it to ensure that the federal government would not interfere with
state governments:
To make laws binding on the People of the United States in all cases which
may concern the common interests of the Union: but not to interfere with
the government of the individual States in any matters of internal police
which respect the government of such States only, and wherein the general
welfare of the United States is not concerned.2 6
The convention defeated this proposal by a vote of eight to two.27
Gunning Bedford of Delaware then moved to further clarify the princi-
ples of Resolution VI: "That the national Legislature ought to possess the
legislative rights vested in Congress by the confederation;" 28 "and moreover
to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in
those to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the har-
mony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual
21. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 21 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1966).
22. Id. at 47; see id. at 53-54.
23. Id. at 243.
24. Id. at 252, 277.
25. Id. at 322.
26. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 21, at 21 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see id. at 25. James Wilson seconded the motion, understanding it as a
friendly amendment, but Gouverneur Morris objected, arguing that "[t]he internal police, as it would
be called & understood by the States ought to be infringed in many cases, as in the case of paper
money & other tricks by which Citizens of other States may be affected." Id. at 26.
27. Id. at 26.
28. Id. at 14; see id. at 16-17.
Commerce 9October 20 10]1
Michigan Law Review
legislation."2 9 The Bedford amendment passed six to four, and the amended
Resolution VI was adopted by a vote of eight to two.30
The amended version of Resolution VI, along with the other resolutions,
was then handed to the Committee of Detail, which, on August 6, 1787,
produced the basic list of enumerated powers that now appears in Article I,
Section 8. It is worth noting that nobody at the Philadelphia Convention
seems to have objected to the transformation from general principle to enu-
merated list. As Jack Rakove explains, "[Tlhe fact that it went unchallenged
suggests that the committee was only complying with the expectations of
the convention."3 It was "an effort to identify particular areas of governance
where there were 'general Interests of the Union,' where the states were
'separately incompetent,' or where state legislation could disrupt the na-
tional 'Harmony.' "1 Indeed, when Pierce Butler of South Carolina
complained that the test of state "incompetence" was far too general, Na-
thaniel Gorham of Massachusetts responded that "[t]he vagueness of the
terms constitutes the propriety of them. We are now establishing general
principles, to be extended hereafter into details which will be precise & ex-
plicit.""
The structural principle of Resolution VI-with its focus on state com-
petencies and the general interests of the Union-was designed to be
adaptable to changing circumstances. Putting to one side the concrete expec-
tations of the Framers, the principle seems to suggest that the federal
government might grow very large and very powerful if social, economic,
and technological changes meant that more and more problems required
federal solutions. Indeed, if spillover effects multiplied and the United
States developed a fully integrated national society and economy, something
like the modem regulatory state might be entirely appropriate.
For this reason, Resolution VI has always made the proponents of a
weak federal government a bit nervous. Thus, in his libertarian reinterpreta-
tion of the Constitution, Randy Barnett argues that the convention actually
rejected Bedford's language.34 Barnett provides no evidence for this extraor-
29. Id. at 21; see id. at 26, 131-32.
30. Id. at 21, 27.
31. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 178 (1996).
32. Id.; accord Robert L. Stem, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47
HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1340 (1934).
33. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 21, at 17 (Madison
spells Gorham's name "Ghorum"). John Rutledge of South Carolina then moved "that the clause
should be committed to the end that a specification of the powers comprised in the general terms,
might be reported." Id. The motion failed by an equally divided vote of the state delegations. But as
it turned out, this was only a temporary delay, for by the middle of August the Committee of Detail,
on which Rutledge served, had done precisely what he had asked for in July. Also see the May 31st
discussion of the delegates, in which they argued for framing general principles that would later be
articulated or enumerated in precise terms. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
supra note 21, at 53-54, 59-60.
34. BARNETT, supra note 4, at 155 (arguing that the Committee of Detail rejected the lan-
guage); id. at 167 (arguing that "the Convention" rejected the language).
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dinary assertion, and I have been unable to find any. The records indicate
that the convention specifically adopted Bedford's language. The Commit-
tee of Detail was not charged with the authority to reject resolutions voted
on by the convention; rather its purpose was to articulate the general princi-
ples stated by the convention in concrete language and specific provisions.
Perhaps what Barnett really means is that the actual language of Resolu-
tion VI does not appear in the final Constitution. That is certainly true. But
there is no evidence that the convention rejected the structural principle
stated in Resolution VI at any point during its proceedings. Indeed, this
principle was the animating purpose of the list of enumerated powers that
appeared in the final draft, and it was the key explanation that Framer James
Wilson offered to the public when he defended the proposed Constitution at
the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention. Wilson was a member of the Com-
mittee of Detail and he would certainly have known if the Committee had
abandoned the principle of Resolution VI. As Wilson explained, however,
the purpose of enumeration was not to displace the principle but to enact it:
[Tlhough this principle be sound and satisfactory, its application to particu-
lar cases would be accompanied with much difficulty, because, in its
application, room must be allowed for great discretionary latitude of con-
struction of the principle. In order to lessen or remove the difficulty arising
from discretionary construction on this subject, an enumeration of particu-
lar instances, in which the application of the principle ought to take place,
has been attempted with much industry and care.
Advocates of a weak federal government might point to the Tenth
Amendment as having rejected Bedford's (and Wilson's) principle. That is
hardly the case. The Tenth Amendment is simply the mirror image of Reso-
lution VI. It tells us that what was not delegated to the federal government
was reserved to the states and to the people. And what principle explains
what was delegated? Those situations in which "the States are separately
incompetent; or in which the harmony of the United States may be inter-
,36
rupted by the exercise of individual legislation."
In sum, the creation of a list of enumerated powers was not simply an at-
tempt to limit the new federal government for its own sake. It was designed
to realize a basic structural idea, and as we look through the list of enumer-
ated powers, we see how each of them furthered the principle announced in
Resolution VI. They allowed the new federal government to engage in a
single foreign policy, a single trade policy, and a single military and defen-
sive strategy. All this was crucial to the infant nation's survival in a
dangerous geopolitical situation where it would have been easy for a foreign
power to divide and conquer the states, where individual states might fre-
quently have acted competitively or at cross-purposes, and where the actions
of individual states might drag the entire Union into a conflict with foreign
35. 2 ELLIOT, supra note 20, at 424-25.
36. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 21, at 21; see id. at
131-32.
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powers. The government also had the power to raise taxes, collect duties,
and spend for the general welfare, to control a single currency, to regulate
naturalization and bankruptcy by uniform laws, and last but not least, to re-
gulate commerce with the Indian tribes, with foreign powers, and among the
several states.
One might argue that we should read each of the enumerated powers
strictly and narrowly so that they do not overlap; otherwise, the enumeration
of each would be superfluous. But this misunderstands the purpose of enu-
meration. Because all of Congress's powers were designed to realize the
structural principle of Resolution VI, they inevitably must overlap to ensure
that the new government would have the power to legislate in all areas
where the states were severally incompetent. As circumstances changed, the
various enumerated powers might intersect in new ways. It should hardly be
surprising, for example, that the powers to raise and support armies, make
war, make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces, and define and punish offenses against the law of nations inevitably
would overlap in practice, both among themselves and with the power to
regulate foreign and Indian commerce. Likewise, there should be no diffi-
culty if the power to regulate commerce comprehends many of the same
subjects as the power to tax and spend for the general welfare, to establish
post roads, to coin money, or to promote the progress of the sciences and the
useful arts. What limits these powers is not that they are hermetically sealed
from each other, but that they extend only to subjects of individual state in-
competence.
The list of enumerated powers was designed so that the new federal
government would have power to pass laws on subjects and concerning
problems that are federal by nature; that is, problems that require a federal
solution, as opposed to national problems that occur in many places, but
that do not require coordinated action and a single approach. This is the key
insight of Resolution VI, and it is still true to this day."
Examples of federal problems include questions of foreign and military
policy where the nation needs to speak with a single voice, to marshal re-
sources for the common defense, and to prevent foreign powers from
37. Robert Cooter and Neil Siegel reach a similar conclusion using economic analysis. Ro-
bert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article 1,
Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). Cooter and Siegel explain that public goods bene-
fitting the entire nation are best produced nationally, and that many activities originating within
states produce positive and negative interstate externalities. Costs and benefits that spill over state
lines create incentives for states to free ride on the efforts of other states. This leads to less than
optimal investments in interstate or national public goods and more negative interstate externalities.
In theory, states could band together to achieve interstate benefits and avoid interstate harms, but the
more states that are affected, the higher the transaction costs and the greater the possibility of hold-
outs. As a federation of states grows in size, the transaction costs quickly become prohibitive. A
federal government allows states to solve these problems by majority rule in a national legislature
rather than by requiring unanimous consent through an interstate compact. Plenary federal power
over all subjects, however, allows a majority of states to exploit a minority in cases where there is no
genuine interstate good or collective action problem. Therefore, Cooter and Siegel argue, national
powers should extend only to (1) problems where the federal government is likely to be best at
internalizing interstate externalities and (2) situations involving the provision of national or inter-
state public goods. Id.
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pushing the states around or engaging in divide-and-conquer strategies,
whether relating to trade, immigration military threats, or diplomatic alli-
ances. Domestically, federal problems are those that single states cannot
unilaterally solve by themselves, because activity in one state has spillover
effects in other states, or because a problem that affects multiple states cre-
ates collective action problems, so that some states may be unable or
unwilling to act effectively in ways that promote the general welfare unless
other states do so as well. Finally, federal problems may arise when states
are likely to produce conflicting regulations over a set of activities, engage
in parochial legislation favoring their own interests at the expense of the
general welfare, or engage in escalating forms of provocation or retaliation
against each other. Each of these might hamper economic union in the short
run and threaten political and social union in the long run.
It is a commonplace to say that the national government is a government
of limited and enumerated powers. But it would be more correct to say that
it is a government of federal and enumerated powers, for the purpose of
enumeration is not merely to limit the scope of the powers, but to ensure
that they serve a federal purpose. When we implement congressional powers
through constructions, we must always keep this general principle in mind.
The text of the Commerce Clause reflects this basic structural principle.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 gives Congress the power "[t]o regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes."39 It focuses on relationships between the United States and
foreign powers and Indian tribes, which involve foreign policy concerns,
and activities among the various states, which raise problems of spillover
effects and collective action. Both of these sets of concerns might require
the United States to speak with a single voice, and that is why they are
properly part of the list of enumerated powers.
Earlier I noted that the same words, "regulate commerce," apply to for-
eign commerce, Indian commerce, and interstate commerce. Whatever
"regulate" and "commerce" refer to, there is a strong argument that they
40have the same semantic meaning with the respect to all three examples.
Chief Justice John Marshall made precisely this point in Gibbons v. Ogden,
when he noted that the word "commerce" "must carry the same meaning
throughout the sentence, and remain a unit, unless there be some plain
38. See also id. (offering a list of appropriate federal concerns including securing national
defense, facilitating and protecting national markets, building and maintaining infrastructures that
create beneficial network effects, providing media of economic exchange, setting standards, devel-
oping nationally enforceable intellectual property rights, preventing regulatory races to the bottom,
and protecting natural resources of benefit to the nation).
39. U.S. CoNsT. art 1, § 8, cl. 3.
40. Saikrishna Prakash calls this "the presumption of intrasentence uniformity." Saikrishna
Prakash, Our Three Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 ARK.
L. REv. 1149 (2003). For a response, see Adrian Vermeule, Three Commerce Clauses? No Problem,
55 ARK. L. REV. 175 (2003). Vermeule's arguments, however, go primarily to how best to construct
the Constitution through doctrine, and not to original meaning.
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intelligible cause which alters it."41 Marshall argued that "commerce" must
include navigation, because it would make no sense to think that Congress
could not regulate navigation to and from foreign nations.42
There are three important qualifications to this argument. First, the same
set of words might have different effects in combination with different
words in the same sentence, so that to "regulate commerce with" might not
mean the same thing as to "regulate commerce among." The difference be-
tween Congress's powers over foreign and domestic commerce reflects this
difference in language.
Second, we might have good reasons to choose different constructions
to implement congressional power to regulate foreign commerce, Indian
commerce, and interstate commerce. In fact, that is exactly what happened
in American history. These reasons connect to the different structural pur-
poses for regulating foreign, Indian, and domestic commerce, as well as the
linguistic differences between "with" and "among."43 My point here, how-
ever, is about original semantic meaning-the irreducible requirement of the
basic framework across different generations-and not about the construc-
tions we choose to implement original meaning. The distinction is important
because we could pick different constructions to implement the constitu-
tional text later on as times and conditions change, and this, too, is what has
happened throughout American history.
Third, the Constitution may contain additional textual restrictions on
Congress's powers that may apply differently to these different types of
commerce. Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 requires that "all duties, imposts
and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." Article I, Sec-
tion 9, Clause 5 states that "[n]o tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported
from any state," and Clause 6 states that "[n]o preference shall be given by
any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over those
41. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824).
42. Id. at 197.
43. In an 1829 letter to Joseph Carrington Cabell, James Madison explained that although
the literal meaning of "commerce" is the same for foreign and interstate commerce, the scope of the
two powers should be construed differently because they serve different structural purposes:
I always foresaw that difficulties might be started in relation to that power which could not be
fully explained without recurring to views of it, which, however just, might give birth to spe-
cious though unsound objections. Being in the same terms with the power over foreign
commerce, the same extent, if taken literally, would belong to it. Yet it is very certain that it
grew out of the abuse of the power by the importing States in taxing the non-importing, and
was intended as a negative and preventive provision against injustice among the States them-
selves, rather than as a power to be used for the positive purposes of the General Government,
in which alone, however, the remedial power could be lodged. And it will be safer to leave the
power with this key to it, than to extend to it all the qualities and incidental means belonging to
the power over foreign commerce, as is unavoidable ....
Letter from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRIT-
INGS OF JAMES MADISON 14-15 (1865) (citation omitted). Madison's basic assumption-that the
powers over foreign and domestic commerce are different-is sound even today, although one might
dispute his views about the best contemporary construction of Congress's powers over domestic
commerce.
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of another: nor shall vessels bound to, or from one state, be obliged to enter,
clear, or pay duties in another."
These additional texts affect Congress's powers over domestic, Indian,
and foreign commerce in different ways. For example, although Congress
may treat trade from different foreign countries differently, it may not dis-
criminate between ports in different states of the Union or have different
duties, imposts, or excises for different parts of the country. These provi-
sions limit the powers that Congress might otherwise have had under the
Commerce Clause. They also shape the most reasonable constitutional con-
structions for the Clause. But they do not demonstrate that the words
"regulate" and "commerce" have different semantic meanings when applied
to terms within the same sentence.
II. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF "COMMERCE"
What is the original meaning of "commerce"? Samuel Johnson's dic-
tionary, roughly contemporaneous with the Founding, defines "commerce"
as "Intercourse; exchange of one thing for another, interchange of anything;
trade; traffick."" Johnson's secondary definition of commerce is "common
or familiar intercourse." 45 Today we associate commerce with economics,
trade, and business, but at the time of the founding, "commerce" included
far more than purely commercial activity. It meant "intercourse"-that is,
interactions, exchanges, interrelated activities, and movements back and
44. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (9th ed. 1790) (unpagi-
nated) (defining commerce as a noun); id. (4th ed. 1773) (unpaginated) (same); id. (1st ed. 1755)
(unpaginated) (same). Johnson's first edition offered the following examples of proper usage:
Places of publick resort being thus provided, our repair thither is especially for mutual confer-
ence, and, as it were, commerce to be had between God and us. Hooker, [Ecclesiastical Polity,]
b[ook].v.s.,[Chapter] 17 [18].
How could communities,
Degrees in schools, and brotherhoods in cities,
Peaceful commerce from dividable shores,
But by degree stand in authentick place? Shiakespeare], Troil[ius]. and Cress[ida].
Instructed ships shall sail to quick commerce,
By which remotest regions are ally'd;
Which makes one city of the universe,
Where some may gain, and all may be supply'd. Dryden.
These people had not any commerce with the other known parts of the world. Tillotson
In any country, that hath commerce with the rest of the world, it is almost impossible now to
be without the use of silver coin. Locke.
All of these are examples of exchange, some social, some economic. The primary example is not
economic: Hooker's "places of publick resort" are not inns but churches for public preaching, and
presumably our commerce with God is communication and prayer, not the trade of commodities. In
the fourth edition of 1775, Johnson's example of the second definition of "commerce," "common or
familiar intercourse," also concerns social interactions: "Good-nature, which consists of overlooking
of faults is to be exercised only in doing ourselves justice in the ordinary commerce and occurrences
of life. Addison." Id. (4th ed. 1775).
45. Id.
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forth, including, for example, travel, social connection, or conversation.4
Economic transactions were only a special case of social intercourse. To
have commerce with someone meant to converse with them, mingle with
them, associate with them, or trade with them. 47 "Traffick" was a coarser
word for "trade" (e.g., to traffic in drugs); 48 later it came to mean travel,
whether or not for purposes of trade, and still later, impediments to travel
(i.e., traffic jams).
The contemporary meanings of "intercourse" and "commerce" are far
narrower than their eighteenth-century meanings. We no longer think of
conversation and sociality when we think of intercourse-we think only of
sexual intercourse, which is not the concept referred to by the Commerce
Clause. And when we think of commerce, we no longer think of social in-
teraction, only business and the exchange of commodities. But it is the
broader, eighteenth century meaning and not the narrower, contemporary
meaning that should determine Congress's powers today.
Some contemporary originalists like Justice Clarence Thomas have ar-
gued that the original meaning of "commerce" is very narrow, essentially
limited to the trade or exchange of goods and commodities. 49 Thus, it would
not include manufacturing, mining, or agriculture, much less any non-
economic activities. This reading is anachronistic: by focusing on the dispo-
sition of commodities it reflects a modern conception of commerce viewed
as a subset of economic activity; it completely misses the eighteenth-century
dimensions of commerce as a form of social intercourse.
The concept of "commerce" in the eighteenth century had strong social
connotations which are almost the opposite of our modem focus on com-
modities. It was the exchange of commodities by people that made business
activity "commerce," not the commodities themselves. Commercial rela-
tions were "commerce" because they were relations."o Commerce brought
46. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189-90; see AMAR, supra note 17, at 107-08 (the Com-
merce Clause gives Congress powers to regulate "all forms of intercourse in the affairs of life,
whether or not narrowly economic . .. if a given problem genuinely spilled across state or national
lines").
47. See JOHNSON, supra note 44, (9th ed. 1790) (definition of "commerce" as verb).
48. See id. (defining "traffick").
49. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-86 (Thomas, J., concurring); see BARNETT,
supra note 4, at 280-88; Epstein, supra note 5.
50. The Latin cognate from which "commerce" is derived, commercium, meant not simply
the exchange of goods but a variety of forms of social exchange, interaction, and participation. In
Roman law, the rights of commercium included the basic civil rights of citizens to make transac-
tions, inherit and convey property, and have access to courts to defend their rights. In his Critique of
Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant equates commercium with the German word Gemeinschaft (commu-
nity) and explains that it refers to a "dynamical community." IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE
REASON A213/B260-A214/B261, at 235-36 (Norman Kemp Smith trans., 1929) (1784); see also
HOWARD CAYGILL, A KANT DICTIONARY 117 (1995) (explaining that when Kant uses commercium
he means "free exchange and respect between individuals rather than in terms of shared characteris-
tics or space"). Commercium came to refer to traditional academic feasts, where commercium songs
were sung around the table. Finally, commercium meant correspondence; thus the Royal Society's
famous account of the dispute about the invention of calculus between Sir Issac Newton and Leibniz
is called the Commercium Epistolicum; i.e., a correspondence of letters. JASON SOCRATES BARDI,
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people together, and caused people of different experiences and nationalities
to mingle (think of port cities as an example); therefore many eighteenth-
century thinkers believed that commercial relations fostered tolerance and
understanding, smoothed over social, religious, and cultural differences,
brought refinement of manners, and, in the long run, political and social
peace. A century earlier Montesquieu had coined the term doux commerce,
meaning "sweet commerce" or "gentle commerce," to describe this phe-
51
nomenon.
The Framers of the 1787 Constitution, influenced by these ideas, be-
lieved that commercial relations between different parts of the country
would foster national connection and social cohesion, and that commercial
relations with other nations would keep America peaceful and safe while
avoiding dangerous political and military alliances.52 We see these ideas in
the 1776 Model Treaty and the nation's subsequent Treaties of Amity and
Commerce with Prussia and France.
A striking example of the idea of commerce as intercourse that produces
social cohesion appears in George Washington's Farewell Address. Al-
though the Address is best known for its warning against entangling
alliances with foreign powers, it also offers a vision of commercial inter-
course and networks of transportation and communication as social cement.
Washington argued that the North and South, in an "unrestrained inter-
course" benefiting manufacturing and agriculture, will grow closer
together.5 4 "The East, in a like intercourse with the West" will benefit from
"progressive improvement of interior communications by land and water"
THE CALCULUS WARS: NEWTON, LEIBNIZ, AND THE GREATEST MATHEMATICAL CLASH OF ALL
TIME 198-99 (2006).
51. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS
FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 60-63 (1977).
52. FELIx GILBERT, TO THE FAREWELL ADDRESS: IDEAS OF EARLY AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY 62-72 (1961).
53. Id. at 48-62. Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between the United States of America and
His Most Christian Majesty, U.S.-Fr., Feb. 6, 1788, 8 Stat. 12 (annulled July 7, 1798) (treaty with
France); Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between his Majesty the King of Prussia and the United
States of America, U.S.-Prussia, July 9-Sept. 10, 1785, 8 Stat. 84; see also Treaty of Peace and
Friendship Between the United States of America, and His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Mo-
rocco, U.S.-Morocco, July 15, 1786-Jan. 25, 1787, 8 Stat. 100; Treaty of Amity and Commerce,
Concluded between his Majesty the King of Sweden and the United States of North America, U.S.-
Swed., Apr. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 60; Treaty of Amity and Commerce between their High Mightiness the
States General of the United Netherlands, and the United States of America, to wit: New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticutt, New-York, New-Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia. North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, U.S.-
Neth., Oct. 8, 1782, 8 Stat. 32. The famous Jay Treaty of 1794 was styled a "Treaty of Amity,
Commerce and Navigation." Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation Between His Britannic
Majesty and the United States of America, by their President, with the Advice and Consent of their
Senate, U.S.-U.K., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116. The Jay Treaty became controversial in part because
of concerns that it would tilt the United States politically toward Britain.
54. George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796), available at http://
avalon.law.yale.edu/ 8th.century/washing.asp.
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which will produce not only both exchanges of goods and materials but "an
indissoluble community of interest as one nation."-'
If we want to capture the original meaning of "commerce," we must stop
thinking primarily in terms of commodities. We must focus on the ideas of
interaction, association, sociability, and the movement of persons that busi-
ness (in its older sense of being busy or engaged in affairs) exemplifies.
I will call the contrasting view held by Justice Thomas and others-that
the original meaning of "commerce" is the trade or exchange of commodi-
ties-the "trade theory." The trade theory immediately runs into difficulties,
because "trade" or "exchange of goods" does not literally include methods
of transportation, like navigation. However, the Framers clearly sought to
give the new government powers over navigation and often used the terms
"commerce" and "navigation" interchangeably.16 So in order to ensure that
Congress can regulate navigation the trade theory must treat "commerce"
non-literally as a metonym (a word that denotes one thing but also refers to
a related thing)." Alternatively, we might argue that the Necessary and
Proper Clause gives Congress power over transportation (although the ques-
tion would remain whether Congress could reach transportation that is not
used for purposes of trade).
Now if the word "commerce" was used non-literally in the Constitu-
tion's text, or if the Necessary and Proper Clause was required to give
Congress the power to regulate navigation, one would think that opponents
of the Constitution (or the Framers at the Philadelphia convention itself)
would have pointed this out. This didn't happen; as noted above, people rou-
tinely spoke of navigation as falling within commerce. This in itself should
suggest that there is something wrong with the trade theory. We do not have
to read the word non-literally (or bring in the Necessary and Proper Clause)
if we adopt the actual eighteenth-century definition of commerce as "inter-
course," which necessarily includes movements back and forth and therefore
easily comprehends navigation and, indeed, every form of transportation
and communication.
55. Id.
56. For a the discussion of navigation acts in the Philadelphia Convention on August 29,
1787, see 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 21, at 449-53; id. at
631 (remarks of George Mason).
57. Justice Thomas does not appear to recognize that under the eighteenth-century dictionary
definitions he offers to prove his case, including navigation would be a non-literal usage. Instead, he
simply adds "as well as transporting for these purposes" to his own definition of commerce. See
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-86 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). Perhaps he assumes
that "traffick" includes travel, as it does today, although in the eighteenth century it was a synonym
for trade. Randy Barnett, to his credit, immediately sees the difficulty. BARNETT, supra note 4, at
291-93. He notes that the Framers might have used words "which did not accurately express their
intentions." Id. at 292. He proposes that navigation might be included in commerce "because of its
intimate connection to the activity of trading," id., and because the Framers seem to have spoken of
navigation and commerce together frequently, id. at 292-93. That is, he proposes a metonymic
extension of the word.
58. BARNErr, supra note 4, at 293.
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By 1824, in Gibbons v. Ogden, counsel for Ogden tried to argue that
"commerce" meant only trade or exchange. Chief Justice Marshall bluntly
rejected the argument:
This would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of its
significations. Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic [i.e., trade], but it is
something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse
between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated
by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.59
Marshall clearly did not suggest that treating navigation as commerce was a
non-literal usage or that the Necessary and Proper Clause was required: "All
America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word 'commerce,'
to comprehend navigation . . . . [T]he attempt to restrict it comes too late."'
Another group of modem scholars, including Douglass Adair, Walton
Hamilton, and William Crosskey, and more recently Grant Nelson and
Robert Pushaw, have also noted that the trade theory is artificially narrow,
and have offered an economic theory of commerce.6 ' The economic theory
accepts that the core meaning of "commerce" is trade, but expands it
non-literally in two different ways. First, it treats "commerce" as a synec-
doche-a figure of speech in which a part stands for a larger whole. The
economic theory argues that "commerce" stands for "economic behavior,"
or "the economy." Thus, Congress's power to regulate "commerce" ex-
tends to all forms of business and economic activity, including
manufacturing, agriculture, all gainful employment, and all business con-
61
tracts, including employment contracts. Second, like the trade theory, the
economic theory treats "commerce" as a metonym because it argues that
commerce includes associated transportation networks used for engaging
in trade and economic activity.
59. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824).
60. Id. at 190; see also 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES §§ 1057-62 (5th ed. 1994) (expanding on Marshall's arguments and maintaining
that commerce "comprehend[s] navigation and intercourse").
61. See I WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES (1953); WALTER H. HAMILTON & DOUGLASS ADAIR, THE POWER TO Gov-
ERN (1937); Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying
First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social
Issues, 85 IowA L. REV. I (1999).
62. See CROSSKEY, supra note 61, at 288-92; Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 61, 9-10, 14-21,
35-42; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A Critique of the Narrow Interpretation of the
Commerce Clause, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 695, 700 (2002).
63. See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 61, at 37. Robert Natelson takes a position between
the trade theory and the economic theory, arguing that "commerce" is a legal term of art that refers
to "the sort of [economic] activities engaged in by merchants" but does not include all gainful eco-
nomic activity. Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Meaning Of "Commerce" in the Commerce Clause, 80
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 789, 845 (2006). Natelson argues that in legal documents "commerce" referred to
"buying and selling products made by others (and sometimes land), associated finance and financial
instruments, navigation and other carriage, and intercourse across jurisdictional lines." Id. The evi-
dence Natelson provides is actually consistent with Marshall's theory of commerce as "commercial




In 2005 in Gonzales v. Raich6 the Supreme Court came very close to
adopting the economic theory. Without explicitly defining "commerce," the
Raich Court argued that Congress had the power to regulate both interstate
and intrastate economic activities that affected interstate commerce, and
then defined "economics" as "the production, distribution, and consumption
of commodities."6  If we combine the economic theory with the idea that
Congress can regulate interstate transportation networks (including intra-
state networks that connect to those networks) and anything that moves (or
has moved) in these networks, the federal government enjoys very wide
66powers.
The economic theory is a definite improvement on the trade theory be-
cause it can account for a greater share of the data. There is plenty of
evidence that at the time of the Founding people used the word "commerce"
to include a wide range of economic activities, sometimes called the
"branches of commerce."6 1 In fact, once we read these various sources, the
trade theory seems far less plausible. But in another sense the economic
theory is also ahistorical. Viewing history through modem eyes, it focuses
solely on economics rather than on the social relations and social interaction
through which the economy operates. It also maintains that the Constitution
uses "commerce" non-literally in not one, but two different ways, and, once
again, nobody in 1787 seems to have noticed this fact or remarked on it. To
be sure, the Constitution has plenty of non-literal language. The word
"speech" in the First Amendment is a non-literal usage; so too are the words
"writings" and "discoveries" in the Progress Clause.' But if we start with
64. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
65. Id. at 25-26 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (1966)).
66. Not all advocates of the economic theory, however, would accept these extensions. See
Pushaw & Nelson, supra note 62, at 698, 698-99 & nn.28-29 (arguing for purely economic mean-
ing); cf Natelson, supra note 63, at 845 (same).
67. See, e.g., CROSSKEY, supra note 61, at 84-89, 96-113; HAMILTON & ADAIR, supra note
61, at 52-63, 79-81, 89-100; Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federal-
ism: The Supreme Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2213, 2229-30
(1996) (quoting ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONs 690-716 (3d ed. 1784)); Nelson & Pu-
shaw, supra note 61, at 16-21.
68. The word "speech" in the First Amendment is both a synecdoche-where a part stands
for a larger whole-and a metonym-where a word stands for something related to it. Thus,
"speech" refers to a larger category of communication including writing, singing, painting, drama,
moviemaking, and broadcasting. It also protects media of communication and various activities
associated with communication. Similarly, "writings," for purposes of the Progress Clause, are not
limited to written marks on paper, but include many other forms of fixed communication, like maps,
drawings, sculptures, even software programs. And "discoveries" in the same clause refers to new
inventions and new technology, not to scientific discoveries about the laws of nature, which are not
patentable.
As one might expect, non-literal usage presents many problems for constitutional interpreta-
tion. First, we must have evidence that a non-literal usage was understood by the general public. For
example, although in theory, "thirty five," the minimum age for Presidents, could be a non-literal
usage, the historical context does not support this. Second, assuming the usage is non-literal, we
must figure out what set of concepts the text refers to. This makes the question of original meaning
very difficult to disentangle from original expected application; nevertheless our goal is not to re-
cover original expected application, but to figure out the animating principles or policies that
naturally led people to use words non-literally. Third, some non-literal usages at the time of enact-
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the primary eighteenth-century definition of "commerce" as "intercourse,"
we do not need to treat the word as a metonym or synecdoche. We can ac-
count for all of the evidence of linguistic usage offered by proponents of the
trade and economic theories, and, as we shall see shortly, we can account for
examples that the other theories cannot. When people like George Washing-
ton, John Marshall, and Joseph Story use the words "commerce" and
"intercourse" interchangeably, perhaps we should listen to them.
Advocates of the "trade" theory argue that in the Philadelphia conven-
tion and the ratification debates delegates spoke only about questions of
trade and potential barriers to trade." But constitutional debates tend to fo-
cus on the key concerns that divide people at the time and not on the many
possible applications of constitutional language. Even if the Framers used
the term in its narrowest possible sense (which they did not), the public
meaning of the words to a general audience was much wider, and surely it is
the general publicly understood meaning of the words used that should
count.o
Modem defenders of the trade theory, like Justice Thomas, are quite
critical of much of contemporary Commerce Clause doctrine. Yet, ironically,
contemporary Commerce Clause doctrine is actually based on the trade the-
ory. The Supreme Court adopted the distinctions between commerce,
agriculture, and manufacturing in the early nineteenth century, in part to
maintain distinctions between local and national power.7 The trade theory is
actually a constitutional construction adopted in a particular historical con-
text that limited the scope of "commerce" in order to maintain an underlying
structural principle.
Although the economic and social conditions that gave rise to this con-
struction have vanished, the Court has never officially abandoned this
nineteenth-century construction. Instead, the Court simply worked around it,
adding a wide variety of doctrines that now give the federal government the
power to do most of the things it wants to do. For example, without deciding
that commerce includes agriculture or manufacturing, the Court held in
1941 in United States v. Darby that Congress can regulate intrastate activity
72
that cumulatively and substantially affects interstate commerce. The Court
also repeatedly leveraged the view that Congress can regulate navigation. In
the early nineteenth century people disagreed about whether commerce
ment eventually become generally accepted meanings of a word, which makes it difficult to know
what the original meaning was.
69. See e.g., BARNETT, supra note 4, at 282-89. But see Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 61, at
13-42; Pushaw & Nelson, supra note 62, at 709-11 (providing counterexamples in the debates).
70. Pushaw & Nelson, supra note 62, at 700.
71. Howard Gillman, More on the Origins of the Fuller Court's Jurisprudence: Reexamining
the Scope of Federal Power Over Commerce and Manufacturing in Nineteenth-Century Constitu-
tional Law, 49 POL. REs. Q. 415, 421-23 (1996).
72. See 312 U.S. 100, 113 ("While manufacture is not of itself interstate commerce, the
shipment of manufactured goods interstate is such commerce . . . .").
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included any other forms of transportation." However, the Court gradually
extended Congress's powers to include telegraphs, railroads, and new forms
of transportation; roads, bridges, and tunnels; and instrumentalities of trans-
portation like cars and buses.74 The Court also eventually gave Congress the
power to regulate other instrumentalities of trade like telegraph, telephone,
and communication networks." Finally, the Court has held that all instru-
mentalities of transportation and all items that move or ever have moved in
interstate transportation networks, or have crossed state lines, are within
Congress's commerce power, whether or not they have anything to do with
trade or exchange. The Court has done all this without ever officially aban-
doning the distinction between commerce, manufacturing, and agriculture.
Contemporary Commerce Clause doctrine since the New Deal has often
been defended as pragmatic and realistic because it recognizes that we live
in a fully integrated national economy. But in another sense the doctrine is
quite formalistic and even a little bizarre. The courts gave the federal gov-
ernment its current powers by stretching older constructions and multiplying
legal fictions. The doctrine looks the way it does because courts began with
a very narrow construction of "commerce" as trade plus navigation and
gradually built an elaborate superstructure on top of it, expanding it beyond
all recognition. It is like a vast mansion that was built with no particular ra-
tional plan around a modest bungalow. This happened in part because the
Supreme Court often does not like to overrule older cases explicitly, but in-
stead works around them, 7  and in part due to the federal courts'
characteristically evolutionary and ad hoc forms of common law decision
making.
Contemporary critics of Commerce Clause doctrine-especially eco-
nomic libertarians-would like to return to a narrow version of the trade
theory without these many workarounds. But the trade theory remains ad
hoc and formalistic even if we remove all of the later additions. That is be-
cause in today's world it is not a theory that is well designed to serve the
Constitution's key structural principle: empowering the federal government
to legislate in areas in which the states are severally incompetent. Rather,
73. See, e.g., veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568, 573-74 (1852) (explaining that Con-
gress's powers under the Commerce Clause do not include "control over turnpikes, canals, or
railroads").
74. BORIS 1. BITTKER WITH BRANDON P. DENNING, BITTKER ON THE REGULATION OF IN-
TERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE 3-8 to -16, 3-20 to -24 (1999) (tracing the evolution of the
Court's doctrines).
75. Id. at 3-30 to -39.
76. See, e.g., Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977); United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336 (1971).
77. Donald H. Regan, How To Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally
Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 554, 562 (1995) (labeling current doctrine "a new
formalism" which is 'pragmatic' only in the sense that it can always serve the goal of justifying
federal power").
78. Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The Document And The
Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REv. 26, 40-41 & n.44 (2000).
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the trade theory is designed to limit the federal government per se, and it
cripples the federal power to protect civil rights, employee rights, public
health, public safety, and the environment in ways that the American public
would find totally unacceptable. It is a construction that lacks democratic
legitimacy and thus fails as "our law."
By contrast, if we returned to the original meaning of "commerce" as in-
tercourse, the Commerce Clause would be perfectly adaptable to modern
conditions. Call this approach the "interaction theory" of commerce. It has
been offered in different forms by John Marshall, Joseph Story, Justice Hu-
go Black, and Akhil Amar. 9 Donald Regan and Steven Calabresi have
advanced similar ideas without specifically connecting their arguments to
the original meaning of the text.so
The interaction theory defines "commerce" according to its broadest
eighteenth-century meaning as "intercourse." The primary focus of the
Clause is "commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in
all its branches."' Nevertheless Congress can also regulate other forms of
interaction, like communications and transportation networks, whether they
are used for commercial or noncommercial purposes.
Under the interaction theory, Congress has the power to regulate all in-
82teractions or affairs with foreign governments and with the Indian tribes.
Congress also has the power to regulate interactions or affairs among the
several states. This would include activities that are mingled among the
states or affect more than one state, because they cross state borders, be-
cause they produce collective action problems among the states, or because
they involve activity in one state that has spillover effects in other states.
Thus, the interaction theory closely connects the language of the Commerce
Clause to the structural principle of Resolution VI that underlies the enu-
83
meration of federal powers.
79. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824) (opinion of Marshall, C.J.); STORY,
supra note 60, at §§ 1057-62; United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 549-53
(1944) (opinion of Black, J.); AMAR, supra note 17, at 107-08.
80. See Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In De-
fense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 781-84, 805-07, 814-30 (1995) (arguing
that externalities produced by state policies justify the scope of federal power); Regan, supra note
77, at 555-59 (arguing that federal power is justified in order to solve problems that states cannot
solve individually).
81. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189-90 (opinion of Marshall, C.J.).
82. At Philadelphia, the convention originally voted to give Congress the power to regulate
"affairs" with the Indian tribes. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note
21, at 321. When it prepared the list of enumerated powers, the Committee of Detail attached this
power to the end of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 367; see also id. at 569 (Report of the Committee
of Style). There is no evidence, however, that the shift from "affairs" to "commerce" was thought to
change the meaning or the scope of the powers granted. AMAR, supra note 17, at 107 & n.17.
Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress had the power of "regulating the trade and
managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States, provided that the legislative
right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or violated." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION,
art. IX, 4. Since under Resolution VI Congress was to have at least the powers of the old confed-
eration, we may assume that "commerce" included both "trade" and "affairs."
83. As Justice Black explained:
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As noted previously, the interaction theory accounts for all of the his-
torical evidence offered by defenders of the trade and economic theories
without having to resort to non-literal usages. As I shall now show, it is also
consistent with other evidence of linguistic usage that the two other theories
have difficulty explaining.
If we view the Commerce Clause through the lens of the central reasons
for forming the Constitution and the central questions that faced the new
nation-foreign affairs and dealings with Indian tribes-reading "com-
merce" to mean "intercourse" or "interactions" makes the most sense. The
Clause enabled "Congress to regulate all interactions (and altercations) with
foreign nations and Indian tribes," which "if improperly handled by a single
state acting on its own, might lead to needless wars or compromise the in-
terests of sister states."8
One of the first things the new government did, for example, was to re-
gulate its interactions with the Indian tribes, through a series of Trade and
Intercourse Acts beginning in 1790. The title of these acts was apt: they not
only required licenses for trade with Indians, but also punished "any crime
upon, or trespass against, the person or property of any peaceable and
friendly Indian or Indians."" These crimes did not necessarily involve trade
The power confided to Congress by the Commerce Clause is declared in The Federalist to be
for the purpose of securing the "maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the
States" ... It is the power to legislate concerning transactions which, reaching across state
boundaries, affect the people of more states than one;-to goven affairs which the individual
states, with their limited territorial jurisdictions, are not fully capable of governing.
Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. at 551-52 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 41 (James Madison)).
84. AMAR, supra note 17, at 107.
85. An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, Act of July 22, 1790,
ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (1790) (expired 1793). Congress passed new versions repeatedly during the ante-
bellum era, with changing provisions. Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329 (repealed 1796); Act
of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, 1 Stat. 469 (expired 1799); Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743 (expired
1802); Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139 (repealed 1834); Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4
Stat. 729. The current version of the Trade and Intercourse Acts is 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2006), which
now covers only purchases and grants of land from Indian tribes.
The first such statute, the 1790 Act, does regulate economic transactions with Indians and the
Indian tribes. For example, it requires a license to do business with Indian tribes and it holds that
sales of lands by Indians are not valid unless "made and duly executed at some public treaty, held
under the authority of the United States." I Stat. 137 § 3. But section 5 of the Act also regulates
ordinary crimes committed against members of the Indian tribes:
SEc. 5: And be it further enacted, That if any citizen or inhabitant of the United States, or of ei-
ther of the territorial districts of the United States, shall go into any town, settlement or
territory belonging to any nation or tribe of Indians, and shall there commit any crime upon, or
trespass against, the person or property of any peaceable and friendly Indian or Indians, which,
if committed within the jurisdiction of any state, or within the jurisdiction of either of the said
districts, against a citizen or white inhabitant thereof, would be punishable by the laws of such
state or district, such offender or offenders shall be subject to the same punishment, and shall
be proceeded against in the same manner as if the offence had been committed within the ju-
risdiction of the state or district to which he or they may belong, against a citizen or white
inhabitant thereof.
Id. at § 5.
The reason for section 5 of the 1790 Act is fairly clear: Congress wanted to keep the peace
with nonbelligerent Indian tribes; if Americans attacked Indians or trespassed on their property, this
might damage foreign relations. In fact, the 1796 Act is specifically entitled "An Act to regulate
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or even economic activity; they could involve assault, murder, or rape. Note
as well that even if the point of regulating these crimes was because of their
likely effects on trade with the Indian tribes, the activities regulated were
themselves not economic. And note finally that the 1790 and 1793 Trade
and Intercourse Acts could not be justified as legislation designed to enforce
treaties; they applied to crimes against Indians whether or not they had
signed treaties with the United States. Congress clearly believed that it
could reach both economic and noneconomic activity under the Indian
Commerce Clause; 8 at the very least it believed that it could regulate none-
conomic activity in order to protect trade and diplomatic relations that
would further trade." This is hardly surprising. It was assumed in interna-
tional law at the time of the founding that international intercourse included
both commercial and noncommercial aspects that were inevitably inter-
twined.
Neither the trade theory nor the economic theory can explain why the ear-
ly Trade and Intercourse Acts would be constitutional unless we assume that
Congress has the auxiliary power to regulate noneconomic (or nontrade)
Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, and to preserve Peace on the Frontiers." Congress's
power to regulate "commerce" (i.e., intercourse or interactions) with the Indian tribes is the natural
source of the prohibitions in the 1790 Act.
The Trade and Intercourse Act of 1793, which succeeded the 1790 Act, made even clearer that
noneconomic transactions were covered: it prohibited "murder, robbery, larceny, trespass or other
crime, against the person or property of any friendly Indian or Indians." I Stat. 329 § 4.
86. Beginning in 1796, the Trade and Intercourse Acts do enforce treaty obligations-for
example, they limit hunting and cattle drives on Indian lands-although they continue to prohibit
ordinary crimes against Indians whether or not there is a treaty. I Stat. 469 § 2. (The ban on crimes
against the person of Indians was not removed until the 1834 version.)
87. Another example is Congress's attempt to protect Indians from the influence of alcohol.
Congress made it a crime not only to sell alcohol, but to give it away, or even to bring it into Indian
Country. Section 20 of the Trade and Intercourse Act of June 30, 1834, made it a crime to "sell,
exchange, give, barter, or dispose of any spiritous liquor or wine to an Indian (in the Indian Coun-
try)" or "to introduce, or attempt to introduce, any spiritous liquor or wine into the Indian Country)"
except as required by the War Department. Indian Intercourse Act, 4 Stat. 729 (1834). The Act was
amended in 1862 to protect Indians who were not in Indian Country as long as they were "under the
charge of any Indian superintendent or Indian agent appointed by the United States." Act of Febru-
ary 13, 1862, 12 Stat. 339 (1862).
The Court upheld the 1862 act in United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1865) and
United States v. Forty-Three Gallons Of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188 (1876). Holliday involved a sale to an
Indian, while Forty-Three Gallons involved transportation "with intent to sell, dispose of, and dis-
tribute." 93 U.S. at 189. In Holliday Justice Miller held that the law properly regulated not only
"buying and selling and exchanging commodities, which is the essence of all commerce," but also
"the intercourse between the citizens of the United States and those tribes, which is another branch
of commerce, and a very important one." 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 417.
88. In United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378 (1886), Justice Miller argued that crimi-
nal laws that regulated Indians living on reservations might not fall within the Indian Commerce
Clause, if they were not part of a larger set of "trade and intercourse laws." This is consistent with
the notion that Congress's power is regulating commerce with the Indian tribes, rather than simply
regulating the Indian tribes per se.
89. See, e.g., ADAM M. McKEOWN, MELANCHOLY ORDER: ASIAN MIGRATION AND THE
GLOBALIZATION OF BORDERS 91 (2008) ("At the turn of the nineteenth century, intercourse was
generally conceived as the entwined relationships of trade and diplomacy between nations."); see
also GILBERT, supra note 52, at 92 (arguing that in eighteenth century conceptions of power politics,
diplomacy, trade, and military strategy were inseparable).
Michigan Law Review
activity that affects foreign or Indian commerce. That is, we must assume
that Congress can reach activities that do not involve trade or are not eco-
nomic in order to protect its powers to regulate trade or other economic
activity, perhaps under the Necessary and Proper Clause. If so, then the two
theories essentially merge into the interaction theory. Note, however, that the
Clause says that Congress can regulate "commerce" with foreign nations
and with the Indian tribes, not "activity that affects commerce" with foreign
nations and with the Indian tribes. The interaction theory is therefore more
consistent with the text.
Immigration offers a second example of the limitations of the trade and
economic theories. Although the 1787 Constitution bestows a power "[tfo
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,"9 it does not specifically men-
tion the power to control immigration. We could infer the power from the
naturalization power or from Congress's power to declare war or its powers
"[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions."9' But there is a far more obvious
source of the power to regulate the flow of populations across the nation's
borders. It is the commerce power, which appears in the clause immediately
before the naturalization power. 92 The eighteenth-century definition of com-
merce as "intercourse" or "exchange" among different peoples easily
encompasses immigration and emigration of populations for any purpose,
whether economic or noneconomic.
Article I, Section 9, Clause I limits Congress's power to prohibit "the
Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing
shall think proper to admit" before 1808.9 Where does that power to pro-
hibit come from? The obvious source, once again, is Congress's power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations and the Indian tribes. Indeed, this
was assumed both in the debates in Philadelphia and at the time of the
Founding.94 Note that even if the "importation" of slaves into the United
States was trade narrowly defined, the "migration" of other persons-which
might include free white immigrants-was not, although it still fell under
the commerce power. In the period before the Civil War the use of the com-
merce power to regulate immigration became increasingly bound up with
disputes over Congress's powers to regulate slavery, and many different
theories emerged.95 Following the abolition of slavery, the Supreme Court
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
91. Id. at cl. 15.
92. Id. at cl. 3.
93. Id. at § 9, cl. 1.
94. In the Virginia Ratifying Debates, Edmund Randolph noted, "To what power in the gen-
eral government is the exception made respecting the importation of negroes? Not from a general
power, but from a particular power expressly enumerated. This is an exception from the power given
them of regulating commerce." 3 ELLIOT, supra note 20, at 464.
95. See DAVID L. LIGHTNER, SLAVERY AND THE COMMERCE POWER (2006). The South was
firmly opposed to any suggestion that Congress might regulate the interstate slave trade under the
Commerce Clause, even though, if slavery were not involved, the question would be fairly easy.
(Moreover, no one doubted Congress's ability to regulate or even ban the foreign slave trade after
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returned to the original assumption that Congress had the power to regulate
immigration under the Commerce Clause. Thus, in Chy Lung v. Freeman,
the Court argued, consistent with the structural principle in Resolution VI,
that:
[t]he passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens and subjects
of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress [under its] . . . power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations: the responsibility for the char-
acter of those regulations, and for the manner of their execution, belongs
solely to the national government. If it be otherwise, a single State can, at
her pleasure, embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other nations.
The interaction theory best explains and justifies Congress's powers over
immigration. Congress could regulate immigration under the trade theory to
the extent that it can regulate methods of transportation used for trade. Con-
gress could regulate immigration under the economic theory to the extent
that people pay for their travel and transportation companies engage in eco-
nomic activity. But neither theory would reach a person entering the country
on foot from Mexico or Canada, even if the purpose was to make a living in
the United States. If these theories cannot explain why Congress has the
power to control the flow of people walking into the country, they are not
very plausible accounts of the power to control the country's borders. To be
sure, migration of populations affects the price of goods and labor. There-
fore, once again, if we postulate that Congress has the power to regulate
nontrade or noneconomic activity that affects commerce (defined either as
trade or economic activity), then the trade and economic theories merge into
the interaction theory. In that case, the interaction theory is superior because
it is simpler and it better corresponds to the actual words of the Constitution.
Today, courts would probably say that Congress's power to regulate
immigration (and indeed conduct foreign affairs generally) comes from the
plenary power doctrine, which was introduced in the Chinese Exclusion
Case" and was stated most forcefully in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Ex-
port Corporation." The plenary power doctrine, however, has no basis in the
text. It was created in the late nineteenth century in order to give Congress a
free hand in regulating foreign affairs at a time when courts held that the
scope of Congress's domestic powers were very limited.
I808.) The Supreme Court debated the questions in a trio of cases: The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 283 (1849); Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841), and New York v. Miln, 36 U.S.
(II Pet.) 102 (1837).
96. See, e.g., The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 591 (1884); New York v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 107 U.S. 59, 60 (1883); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259,
270 (1875).
97. 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875).
98. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
99. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-18 (1936).
100. Justice Sutherland's argument rested on the fiction that the states were never really sov-
ereign in foreign affairs and therefore "the investment of the federal government with the powers of
external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution." Id. at 318. This
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If one had to defend an uneumerated plenary power to conduct foreign
affairs, the best justification would be something like the structural principle
stated in Resolution VI: Congress must have the power to regulate in the
interests of the nation as a whole, in all areas where the states are severally
incompetent or where individual actions by states might disturb the har-
mony of the Union. The argument for such an unenumerated power seems
entirely sensible, but it also flies in the face of the claim that the federal
government is a government of limited and enumerated powers and that the
Framers exercised considerable care in their choice of which powers to give
the new federal government. Because foreign affairs were so crucial to the
Framers' reasons for forming a new Constitution, it seems very strange that
they would have forgotten to give the federal government this power.
But they didn't forget. One doesn't need to postulate a general unenu-
merated power to conduct foreign affairs if one reads the Commerce Clause
according to its original meaning of "intercourse." The Commerce Clause,
like the powers to conduct war, make treaties, and define and punish viola-
tions of international law, is already in the text of the Constitution, and
together with these other powers it gives the federal government the ability
to regulate all kinds of affairs and interactions with the outside world.
Focusing on Congress's powers to regulate foreign commerce also helps
settle whether the word "regulate"-i.e., prescribe rules for commerce-
includes the power to prohibit.'0 ' Surely if Congress has the power to keep
both goods and people out of the country under the Foreign Commerce
Clause, "regulation" must include prohibition. Even under the trade theory,
the power to regulate must include the power to prohibit. The point of the
new federal government was to promote American trade with foreign na-
tions. It could not do this unless it could credibly threaten to block or
would no doubt have come as a surprise to the Framers, especially in those jurisdictions that debated
whether to join the new Constitution.
101. Samuel Johnson's definition of "regulate" is to make regular or to adjust by a rule or a
method. JOHNSON, supra note 44 (9th ed. 1805) (unpaginated); id. (1st ed. 1755) (unpaginated)
(same). Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903), considered whether Congress
could prohibit the shipment of lottery tickets between states as a regulation of interstate commerce.
The four dissenting judges argued that the power to regulate commerce gave Congress only the
power to "free[] such commerce from state discrimination, and not to transfer the power of restric-
tion." Id. at 372 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). They conceded that their theory "does not challenge the
legislative power of a sovereign nation to exclude foreign persons or commodities, or place an em-
bargo, perhaps not permanent, upon foreign ships or manufactures." Id. at 374. Thus, they were
forced to maintain that the word "regulate" had two different meanings for foreign and domestic
commerce, when the more sensible reading would be to distinguish "commerce with" from "com-
merce among."
The majority held that Congress had the power to prohibit undesirable or wrongful commerce
from moving across state borders. Because states might not be able to ban such commerce-this
might be forbidden discrimination against out-of-state business-the federal government was "the
only power competent to that end." Id. at 358. Note especially the Court's use of the word "compe-
tent," echoing Resolution VI's basic structural principle that the federal government has the power to
act where states are severally incompetent. The Champion Court correctly understood that the power
to "regulate"-that is, to prescribe a rule for commerce-includes the power to determine what
commerce is wrongful or undesirable and therefore may be restricted or excluded. Congress may do
more than protect commerce among the states. It may use its powers to promote particular social or
economic policies by regulating commerce that produces spillover effects or creates collective ac-
tion problems.
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embargo goods coming from foreign countries in order to force them to
open up their borders to American goods.
I have argued that the interaction theory makes the most sense of the
meaning of "commerce" because it makes the most sense of Congress's
powers to regulate foreign and Indian commerce. It is true that Congress's
powers to regulate domestic commerce are more constrained. My point,
however, is that people who want to demonstrate that difference by limiting
the meaning of the word "commerce" are looking in the wrong place. As a
result, they have to come up with rather implausible theories for why the
same word in the same sentence points to three different concepts.102
These linguistic somersaults are unnecessary if one reads just a little fur-
ther in the text. The powers of foreign and Indian commerce are different
from powers over interstate commerce because they serve different struc-
tural purposes that are reflected in the text. Congress can regulate commerce
with foreign nations and the Indian tribes, but it can only regulate commerce
among the several states.
III. "AMONG THE SEVERAL STATES"
A. Operations and Effects
What does "among the several states" mean? Samuel Johnson's diction-
ary defines "among" as "in the middle of."03 Randy Barnett argues that
"among" means only commerce "between States" or "between people of
different states," and does not reach commerce that occurs between persons
in the same state.'0 Even if this activity affected other states or the nation as
a whole, Congress could not reach it.'0o In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Justice
Marshall properly rejected this view. He argued that "among" means "in-
termingled with" and that "commerce among the several states" means
"commerce which concerns more States than one."" Thus, even commerce
102. Randy Barnett, for example, notes that ascribing three meanings to the same word raises
potential difficulties with his theory of objective meaning, because that theory focuses on what an
ordinary speaker of the language would understand a word to mean. See BARNETT, supra note 4, at
92-93, 97, 103. However, he argues that "when a group of people agrees to use one word to con-
note, depending on the circumstances, two different meanings, they have objectively manifested
their intentions, albeit in an awkward manner that makes the objective meaning of their words some-
times difficult to discern." Id. at 310. What Barnett has not demonstrated is that there was an
agreement by the ratifiers to assign three different meanings to the same word in the same sentence.
Such an agreement among such a widely dispersed population would have been very difficult to
negotiate and form. Perhaps more importantly for his theory of objective original public meaning,
he has not shown that members of the general public who were not involved in the debates would
have understood that there was an agreement to use one word in three different ways. Instead of
attributing an "awkward manner" to the constitutional text, we might simply look for other ways in
the text to distinguish foreign, Indian, and domestic commerce.
103. JOHNSON, supra note 44 (9th ed. 1805) (unpaginated); id. (1st ed. 1755) (unpaginated)
(same).
104. BARNETT, supra note 4, at 297.
105. Id. at 300.
106. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824).
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that occurs within a single state might be within Congress's regulatory pow-
er if it has external effects on other states or on the nation as a whole. As
Marshall puts it, echoing Resolution VI:
The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its ac-
tion is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those
internal concerns which affect the States generally; but not to those which
are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States,
and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing
some of the general powers of the goverment.
Marshall warned in Gibbons that Congress's power would not apply to
"[t]he completely internal commerce of a State."108 But the question at issue
is what commerce is "completely internal." Marshall and other nineteenth-
century jurists adopted a series of constructions of "commerce among the
several states" designed to limit the reach of the commerce power and pre-
serve distinctions between local and national subjects of regulation.'0 Many
of these distinctions, like the distinction between commerce and production
or between direct and indirect effects on commerce, make little sense today,
but they are not part of the original meaning of the text and we do not have
to accept them.
Instead, we should read the phrase "among the several states" in a way
that is most consistent with the structural principle behind the enumeration
of powers. To use James Wilson's words, Congress can regulate interactions
that extend in their operation beyond the bounds of a particular state, and
interactions that extend in their effects beyond the bounds of a particular
state.'
What kinds of operations extend beyond a state's boundaries? Transpor-
tation and communication are the two most obvious examples. Thus,
Congress can regulate whatever crosses state lines. Equally important, it can
regulate interstate networks of communication and transportation, subject
always, of course, to individual rights protections like the First Amend-
ment.'"
Transportation and communication are not only activities; they occur as
part of networks, which include technologies, institutions, facilities, and
standards that are linked together in a system. Thus, a transportation or
communications network includes not only the actual movement of people,
goods, or electrons, but also an architecture of channels, nodes, and links,
and the technologies, institutions, facilities, and standards that make move-
ment possible.
Transportation and communications networks are crucial to the "com-
merce" of the nation, particularly when we understand "commerce" in the
107. Id. at 195.
108. Id.
109. See infra Part V.
110. 2 ELLIOT, supra note 20, at 424.
111. See Regan, supra note 77, at 571-75.
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eighteenth-century sense of "intercourse." These networks create important
externalities whose value transcends any particular state and can become
more valuable as more people use them; indeed, economists give these ex-
ternalities a special name-they are called network effects. Leaving
regulation of these networks solely to state control might produce conflict-
ing regulations that undermined their efficiency and interoperability and
disturbed the "harmony of the Union." (Imagine, for example, that the state
of Arkansas required all internet traffic to use a special protocol that no one
else used.) This would reduce the value of these networks both within and
without a state and impose costs on persons in other states.
The generation of 1787 did not use the term "network effects," a product
of twentieth century economic theory. But they well understood that the
ability to move and communicate throughout the country was essential both
to political union and to a vibrant commercial republic.12 It follows that
Congress also has the power to regulate intrastate transportation and com-
munication networks, because they are part of larger national networks.
Every element of interstate transportation and communications networks,
Donald Regan has pointed out, operates within the boundaries of some state
(think of telephone poles and railroad tracks), and "[the power to regulate
some particular element" of the network "should not depend on whether that
element itself ever moves across state lines or not.""' The fact that a cellular
antenna or a piece of fiber optic cable remains fixed in the ground in one
state does not mean that Congress cannot regulate it.
What kinds of interactions have effects beyond a single state? These are
interactions that create spillover effects or collective action problems. In the
words of Resolution VI, commerce is "among the several states" when the
states are "separately incompetent" to deal with a particular issue, "or
[when] the Harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the Exer-
cise of individual Legislation."' l4 Note that the structural principle
announced in Resolution VI is somewhat more restrictive than Wilson's
formulation in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention."5 It is not enough that
the activity in question has effects beyond a particular state's borders; what
matters is that these effects generate the sort of problem that makes a federal
solution appropriate. We have already seen that transportation and commu-
nications networks can produce significant spillover effects. But many other
kinds of activities can produce them as well, including environmental pollu-
tion, agriculture, manufacturing, banking, and employment relations.
112. That is one reason why Congress was given the power in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 7
"[tlo establish Post Offices and post Roads." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
113. Regan, supra note 77, at 574; see also Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States (The
Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (upholding federal rate regulation of intrastate railroad
transportation which affects interstate commerce); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870)
(upholding federal safety regulation to steamship moving entirely within a single state).
114. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 21, at 21, 26, 131-
32.
115. ELLIOT, supra note 20, at 424.
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B. Darby and Labor Regulation
Begin with federal minimum wage and maximum hour laws, upheld in
the landmark case of United States v. Darby."'6 The Fair Labor Standards
Act prohibited shipping goods made with substandard labor conditions
across state lines. It also prohibited substandard labor conditions whether or
not the goods crossed state lines.
Congress can ban the interstate shipment of goods made with substan-
dard labor conditions if it believes that these goods unfairly compete with
goods from states that do not have substandard labor conditions. Because
Congress has the right to control interstate transportation and communica-
tions networks, it may control what goods and persons cross state lines,
subject to the Constitution's individual rights guarantees. In this case, the
goods are presumably not defective or dangerous in and of themselves; ra-
ther Congress wants to control their flow across state lines because of the
spillover effects that they produce."'
In Darby Justice Stone also argued that Congress had the power to ban
substandard labor conditions in production in order to enforce the ban on
interstate transportation."' This style of argument is a relic of the trade the-
ory: Congress can control production because production affects trade. If we
start with the interaction theory (or the economic theory, suitably under-
stood), we need not entertain the legal fiction that Congress is regulating
local labor conditions because it helps police the flow of goods across state
lines. Rather, we can move directly to the real issue. Congress may regulate
production because substandard labor conditions in some states create spill-
over effects in other states and raise a potential collective action problem
that only Congress can solve.
Suppose some states prohibit substandard conditions, while others do
not. In the short run at least, firms in unregulated states will probably face
lower production costs, and they can sell their goods more cheaply than
firms in regulated states. In a national market, they will underprice goods
from regulated firms; in particular they will be cheaper in the regulated
states themselves. States that require better working conditions probably
cannot constitutionally block goods from states with substandard labor con-
ditions, because courts would view this as a forbidden discrimination
against out-of-state businesses. Worse still, in the long run firms in regulated
states may threaten to relocate to unregulated states to take advantage of
lower costs and a friendlier business environment. All of this will put eco-
nomic and political pressure on regulated states to allow substandard labor
conditions.
Thus, in a national market, substandard labor conditions are not purely
local matters; they have spillover effects on other states, and individual
116. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
117. See id. at 113-17 for Justice Stone's version of this argument.
118. Id.atil7-21.
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states are separately incompetent to deal with the problem. "9 (There is also a
potential collective action problem if many states would like to improve
working conditions but will not do so unless all the other states do so as
well.) Congress may therefore regulate wages and working conditions be-
cause states face a federal problem that requires a federal solution.120
Note that this argument presumes that what I am calling "substandard"
working conditions really are below an acceptable level-whether for mor-
al, political, or economic reasons-and that additional regulation would be
better, not worse. Often this will be a controversial claim. What some states
regard as unjust violations of human dignity others will think perfectly ac-
ceptable and a protection of liberty of contract for employers and employees
alike. What some states see as unfair competition that pressures them to par-
ticipate in a race to the bottom others will view as a race to the top: good old
fashioned competition that promotes greater liberty, local autonomy, and
productivity. What some states see as a federal problem demanding a federal
solution others will see as not presenting a problem at all other than the
dangers of needless federal interference with individual states' regulatory
choices and their distinctive modes of life.
If the claimed spillover effects are nonexistent or insignificant or if they
are outweighed by the values of liberty and local self-determination, there is
no federal problem that requires a federal solution. If the states disagree
among themselves about these issues, who decides the question? The an-
swer is that Congress decides. The point of having a federal government,
after all, is to resolve conflicts among the different interests in different
states. All states are represented in Congress and they can struggle among
themselves about whether there really is a federal problem and, if so, nego-
tiate the appropriate solution. The Commerce Clause does not require any
particular answer to this question; it simply gives Congress the ability to
solve problems that it reasonably believes to exist.12
119. See id. at 122 (arguing that legislation is necessary to prevent unfair competition from
firms implementing substandard labor conditions that harms businesses implementing acceptable
labor conditions).
120. One might object that some businesses, like laundries and restaurants, do not sell goods
that regularly cross state lines. Regan, supra note 77, at 588-89 (arguing that federal government
should not be able to regulate businesses that produce goods primarily for local consumption).
However, these businesses compete for labor with businesses that do interstate business. Moreover,
labor, like capital, is mobile and may leave for states with better working conditions, thus putting
downward pressure on wages and working conditions in those states. Congress may therefore in-
clude both businesses that ship interstate and those that do not in a comprehensive federal solution.
121. Note that a reasonableness test applies to two different questions: The first is whether
there is a sufficient spillover effect, collective action problem, or other effect on interstate commerce
to justify regulation. The second is whether Congress's choice of regulation is sufficiently adapted to
achieving its purposes in regulating.
The test of reasonableness is not required by the original meaning of the constitutional text. It
is a construction that originates in one of the earliest judicial constructions of Congress's enumer-
ated powers. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). In McCulloch, Chief Justice
Marshall argued that "the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national legisla-
ture that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into
execution." Id. at 421. Such discretion requires that courts defer to Congress's judgment where
reasonable minds may differ. Hence, Marshall concluded that all means that are appropriate and
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The advantage of this construction of "commerce" and "among the sev-
eral states" is that it makes the constitutional question very similar to the
policy question that Congress must debate-whether there are significant
spillover effects or collective action problems and whether these present a
genuine problem that is best solved by a federal solution. By resolving the
policy debate, Congress also resolves the constitutional question, unless its
conclusion is completely unreasonable.
C. Wickard and the Culmination of Individual Effects
Next consider Wickard v. Filburn,122 which many people have assumed
tests the limits of Congress's powers. In fact, Wickard is a fairly easy case, a
standard example of a problem requiring a federal solution. The issue in
Wickard is volatility in agricultural production and prices. Congress believed
that farmers would go through cycles of overproduction leading to low pric-
es, which led to farm bankruptcies, and eventually to new agricultural
shortages. Individual states could not solve this problem by limiting what
their farmers could grow, because farmers in other states might overpro-
duce-indeed, they might have incentives to do so-and this would drive
down prices for all. Thus state agricultural policies have spillover effects on
other states and even if all states wanted to limit production, they cannot do
so unless all the other states who produce the same crops agree. Producing
states might make an informal agreement to do so, but this might violate the
prohibition on interstate compacts in Article I, Section 10, Clause 3.123 After
all, states that consumed, but did not grow, the crop in question might resent
the cartel because it raised costs for their citizens, and they might try to find
ways to retaliate. In any case such an agreement (like all other cartels) might
adapted to legitimate constitutional ends are constitutional exercises of Congress's enumerated
powers. Id.; see also id. at 413-14 (explaining that "necessary" means convenient or useful to
achieving an end); id. at 415-16 ("[Congress must not be] deprive[d] . . . of the capacity to avail
itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legislation to circumstances.");
id. at 419 (explaining that even without the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress may employ
means "which, in its judgment, would most advantageously effect the object to be accomplished");
id. at 420 ("[The Necessary and Proper Clause] cannot be construed ... to impair the right of the
legislature to exercise its best judgment in the selection of measures to carry into execution the
constitutional powers of the government.").
In United States v. Darby, the Supreme Court followed McCulloch by requiring a reasonable
relationship between Congress's choice of means for regulating commerce and its legitimate ends:
Congress, having by the present Act adopted the policy of excluding from interstate commerce
all goods produced for the commerce which do not conform to the specified labor standards, it
may choose the means reasonably adapted to the attainment of the permitted end, even though
they involve control of intrastate activities. Such legislation has often been sustained with re-
spect to powers, other than the commerce power granted to the national government, when the
means chosen, although not themselves within the granted power, were nevertheless deemed
appropriate aids to the accomplishment of some purpose within an admitted power of the na-
tional government.
Darby, 312 U.S. at 121 (citing McCulloch and later cases).
122. 317 U.S. III (1942).
123. The Compact Clause states that "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress ...
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
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be difficult to enforce, and it probably could not be enforced by blocking
agricultural goods coming from defecting states.124 (By contrast, the federal
government has the power to block agricultural exports from foreign na-
tions.) In short, states are severally incompetent to limit agricultural
production. The problem, to the extent one exists, is a federal one, and Con-
gress has the power to decide the nature of the problem and devise an
appropriate solution.
Wickard is famous for the proposition that if the sum of certain activities
is within Congress's powers to regulate-because, for example, it has a suf-
ficiently substantial effect on commerce-Congress can regulate each
individual instance. In Wickard, the activity in question was wheat grown
on a family farm for private consumption, which might substitute for pur-
chased wheat or, if prices rose, might be drawn into the national market.126
Under the interaction theory (or the economic theory) this proposition not
only makes considerable sense, it is almost inevitable.127 Spillover effects
and collective action problems are produced by the sum of many different
individual activities; therefore we must look to the aggregate to decide
whether the problem is both federal and substantial. And if it is, Congress
should be able to reach all the individual instances in a general scheme of
regulation to get at the problem.128
D. Spillovers and Environmental Regulation
Next, consider environmental regulations. Air and water pollution cross
state lines. States may have sufficient incentives to prevent pollution that
falls wholly within their own jurisdictions, but they may have neither suffi-
cient incentive nor sufficient ability to prevent pollution beyond their
borders.
The interaction theory is superior to the economic theory in this case be-
cause not all pollution or environmental damage is caused by economic
activity, even if it has economic effects. Once again, however, if we adopt
the construction that Congress may regulate noneconomic activities that
cumulatively affect interstate economic activity, there is little practical dif-
ference between the two theories.
124. See Regan, supra note 77, at 583-85.
125. 317 U.S. at 127-29.
126. Id. at 127-28.
127. See Regan, supra note 77, at 583-84.
128. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17-22 (2005) (upholding federal regulation of
intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154
(1971) ("Where the class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power,
the courts have no power 'to excise, as trivial, individual instances' of the class." (emphasis omit-
ted)); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1942) ("Congress ...
possesses every power needed to make [its] regulation [of interstate commerce] effective. . . . [Its
power] extends to those intrastate activities which in a substantial way interfere with or obstruct the
exercise of the granted power."); cf United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (invalidating a
statutory section that was "not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which
the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated").
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What about the protection of endangered species? Many species migrate
between states, so securing their survival presents a federal problem. What
about species that stay in one state? Congress can protect them if pollution
or threats to their survival (e.g., hunters or predators) come from out of
state. It can also protect them if they are threatened by business activities
that have spillover effects in other states.
The value of environmental protection, however, is not completely cap-
tured by considerations of economic cost; it also concerns how Americans
129
view their relationship to nature and the resources that nature provides us.
The nation's natural resources properly belong to the nation as a whole, and
not to any single state. If interactions among the several states threaten those
resources, the nation as a whole should have the right to protect them.
E. Antidiscrimination Law and the Right to Commerce
Now consider the constitutionality of antidiscrimination laws. Since the
civil rights revolution of the 1960s Congress has passed most of these laws
using its commerce power. Discrimination does not present a federal prob-
lem because, as the Supreme Court once suggested, food served in
discriminating restaurants has traveled from out of state. 1o Rather discrimi-
nation-even in housing and local restaurants-has spillover effects on
states that prohibit discrimination, which these states cannot effectively
counteract on their own. In addition, discrimination affects the ability of
Americans to participate fairly and fully in interstate networks of transporta-
tion and communication.
Like other labor laws, antidiscrimination laws create collective action
problems that may discourage states from prohibiting discriminatory prac-
tices unless other states do so as well. Some antidiscrimination laws may
increase costs for businesses, especially in the short run. Examples include
laws that require accommodation of disabled employees or customers, laws
that require employers to pay women and minorities as much as white men,
laws that prohibit firing or demoting people for discriminatory reasons (creat-
ing problems of proof), and laws that require significant monitoring, record
keeping and compliance costs. As in the previous discussion of United States
v. Darby, firms located in states that permit discrimination may have a com-
petitive advantage over firms in states that prohibit discrimination. Similarly,
states may shy away from passing stronger antidiscrimination laws out of fear
that businesses will migrate to states with weaker laws.
Discrimination within a state may produce spillover effects on other
states in a number of different ways. First, discrimination imposes costs on
employers in interstate enterprises who may not be able to make the most
efficient allocation of resources in their personnel decisions. For example,
businesses may be less likely to assign blacks or gays to jobs that require
129. See Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, and
Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122 (2010).
130. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1964).
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them to move or travel to jurisdictions where housing or public accommoda-
tions discrimination will increase their costs of living or make them less
productive. Some businesses may not move to discriminating jurisdictions
for fear of losing valuable employees or gaining a reputation as discrimina-
tory or hostile to minorities.
Second, discrimination within a state or a region of the country (like the
Jim Crow South) can have spillover effects in other jurisdictions if markets
for goods and services are interconnected. Businesses in states that do not
permit discrimination may alter their employment and production policies in
order to cater to consumers and clients in jurisdictions that permit (or even
expect) discrimination.
Third, if markets are interconnected, credit, employment, risk, and pric-
ing decisions by businesses in jurisdictions that permit (or expect)
discrimination may affect business judgments by firms in other states. Inter-
state effects on business judgments can occur in many different ways.
Regional or local discrimination may lower the average wealth and educa-
tional attainment (and hence expected creditworthiness) of minorities in the
nation as a whole, skewing decisions in nondiscriminating jurisdictions. If
regional patterns of discrimination lead to high rates of poverty and incar-
ceration for racial minorities, this affects nationwide assessments of
criminality, creditworthiness, healthiness, expense, and other risks. Sex dis-
crimination that limits women's job history affects their ability to compete
when they travel to nondiscriminating jurisdictions. In this way, patterns of
subordination in one area of the country lead to informational heuristics and
biases that may limit housing, employment, and other opportunities for
women and minorities in other parts of the country. In sum, if people eco-
nomize on information when they make decisions and make decisions based
on risk pools, the effects of discrimination against women and minorities
can move with them across state lines.
Fourth, minorities, unhappy with poor treatment and limited opportuni-
ties, may leave states that allow discrimination for states that prohibit
discrimination (or have greater protections against discrimination). Gays
may leave socially conservative rural areas to enjoy freer lives in large urban
centers. Jim Crow policies in the South led to the Great Migration of blacks
to cities in the North. Immigration from discriminating states will put pres-
sure on housing, wages, and working conditions in more egalitarian states,
especially if the new immigrants are used to working at lower wages and
under inferior working conditions. Accordingly, the flow of cheap labor into
the state and the influx of minority groups into neighborhoods and schools
may exacerbate discrimination against minorities by majority groups, un-
dermining the state's nondiscrimination policies and increasing costs for
public and private sectors alike.
Many people-including members of Congress during the debates over
the 1964 Civil Rights Act-have pointed out that Congress's powers to en-
force the Reconstruction Amendments are a better vehicle for combating
discrimination than the commerce power, because the former powers di-
rectly concern equality and the latter power, in their view, concerns only
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issues of business and trade."' In one sense, this is correct: the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments are and should be an important source of congressional
power to regulate private discrimination.'321n another sense, however, this
criticism misses the deeper purpose of the power to regulate interactions
among the states in a federal system. This may be in part because people
still view the commerce power through the lens of the nineteenth century
trade theory, which defines "commerce" as solely about the exchange (and
transportation) of goods and not in its broader sense of "intercourse," which
includes ideas of sociality, intermixture, and, to use more modem language,
integration.
The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to prevent states from ex-
porting elsewhere the problems they create through unwise and unjust social
policies. To do this, Congress inevitably must make judgments of morality
and policy. That is because one state's externality is another state's liberty.
Activities in different states often affect other states, but not all of them jus-
tify a federal solution as a matter of sound policy. Congress therefore must
decide whether state policies impose real and undesirable effects on other
parts of the Union or whether these policies actually preserve local auton-
omy, economic liberty, and individual choice. One cannot do this unless one
makes judgments of what effects are good or bad and what liberties are
worth preserving.
Antidiscrimimation laws involve Congress's judgment that private dis-
crimination is not a liberty worth protecting, and that the practice of
discrimination is a poison that affects and undermines other parts of the Un-
ion. Jim Crow may have impoverished the South by denying many of its
citizens the chance to become healthy, happy, and productive, but in an inte-
grated economy, it impoverished the North as well. Congress was entitled to
131. See, e.g., A Bill to Eliminate Discrimination in Public Accommodations Affecting Inter-
state Commerce: Hearing on S. 1732 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong. 190-93 (1963)
(statement of Sen. John Cooper). At the same hearing, Senator John Pastore stated:
I believe in this bill, because I believe in the dignity of man, not because it impedes our com-
merce. . .. I like to feel that what we are talking about is a moral issue. . . . And that morality,
it seems to me, comes under the 14th amendment . .. about equal protection of the law.
Id. at 252; see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 291 (1964) (Gold-
berg, J., concurring) ("The primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... as the Court
recognizes ... is the vindication of human dignity and not mere economics."); id. at 292 ("Dis-
crimination is not simply dollars and cents, hamburgers and movies; it is the humiliation, frustration,
and embarrassment that a person must surely feel when he is told that he is unacceptable as a mem-
ber of the public because of his race or color.") (quoting S. REP. No. 872, at 16 (1964)); Robert C.
Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Mor-
rison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 504-05 (2000) ("No one at the time had the slightest doubt but
that the antidiscrimination statutes enacted by Congress during the 1960s were implementing the
equality norms of Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment."); cf Seth P. Waxman, Twins at Birth:
Civil Rights and the Role of the Solicitor General, 75 IND. L.J. 1297, 1312-13 (2000) (noting that
choice to use the commerce power to defend the 1964 Civil Rights Act was based on litigation strat-
egy, not the purpose of the Act).
132. See Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010)
(arguing that Congress has ample authority to pass modem civil rights laws-including those affect-
ing private parties-under its powers to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments).
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decide that in undermining human dignity, the South was dragging other
states down with it. 33
Moreover, the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to give
Americans access to networks of transportation and communication, and to
allow them to enjoy the benefits of commerce (i.e., commercial and non-
commercial intercourse) among the several states. Discrimination
discourages minorities from using these networks fully and fairly. Racial
discrimination discouraged blacks from traveling in the South, and it denied
them economic opportunities nationwide. Because discrimination has multi-
ple ripple effects in an integrated economy, it hinders the ability of
minorities to compete fully and fairly in public life and discourages their use
of the instrumentalities and networks of interstate commerce. Antidiscrimi-
nation laws, in short, protect both freedom of commerce (in its eighteenth-
century sense) and equality in commerce.
These are not simply questions about gross national product. They are
questions of personal liberty-including economic liberty to be sure-but
also of the rights to travel, meet, interact, and live with others throughout the
country. These issues concern the rights to participate in the social and eco-
nomic intercourse of the nation. Congress has to decide what are fair terms
of access and fair opportunities of enjoyment with respect to the networks,
channels, and instrumentalities of interstate commerce. These judgments of
fairness are inevitably political and moral; they are inevitably judgments of
what both liberty and equality require.
F. Federalism and Experimentation
A familiar defense of federalism is that it preserves traditional mores
and local ways of life against national homogenization. This argument has a
checkered pedigree: not only valuable traditions, but also discrimination
against blacks, women, and homosexuals have been defended on these
terms. When states differ about these matters, the argument goes, the har-
mony of the Union and individual freedom are best served by letting each
state decide these questions without federal interference. That may be so
where tradition imposes costs only within a single state. But where dis-
crimination imposes costs on other states, the harmony of the Union is
already disturbed, and Congress may step in. When subordination of social
groups in the name of tradition has spillover effects elsewhere, tradition may
be too costly for the federal government to ignore.
133. Racial discrimination also made our relations with foreign powers more difficult during
the Cold War, which was one motivation for Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) and
the passage of national civil rights laws. MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND
THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 79-114 (2000). Here, however, I focus only on domestic
effects. I do not reach the interesting question of whether Congress may, under its powers to regulate
foreign commerce, reach intrastate activity that would embarrass the nation diplomatically. At least
where no treaty obligations are involved, there might be good reasons to adopt a limiting construc-
tion of Congress's ability to regulate intrastate activities to further the regulation of foreign
commerce or to define and punish offenses against the law of nations.
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A second and more important defense of federalism is that it promotes
innovation and experimentation in different localities. Almost every impor-
tant antidiscrimination principle began with states and local governments.
Indeed, this justification for federalism is in some tension with a defense
based on tradition: experiments mean rejecting customary ways of doing
business. It is hard to see Jim Crow as an experiment. If so, it was an ex-
periment that failed.
We should take the language of experimentation seriously rather than as
a rhetorical excuse for nonregulation, or as a way to resist the application of
federal constitutional rights. Experiments should be encouraged if they work
to the benefit of the entire nation. But if these are genuine experiments, ex-
periments generally end at some point and the results are tabulated;
somebody has to decide whether the experiment is a success or a failure,
and, if a success, adopt best practices nationwide.
Second, some experiments can blow up in your face, and, more impor-
tantly, in your neighbor's. You don't let your neighbor experiment with
nuclear fission next door, because his actions might harm you and others.
Where state experiments throw off harms to other states, Congress may re-
gulate them.
Finally, some types of innovation are best achieved when the federal
government ensures a basic platform of uniform standards on which both
states and private parties can innovate. Gibbons v. Ogden is a good exam-
ple.134 New York sought to promote and reward technological innovation by
awarding a monopoly to a new technology, steamship transportation. The
problem was that the monopoly interfered with the transportation network
along the east coast of the United States. By establishing a single national
coastal licensing scheme, the federal government allowed many different
parties to innovate and compete with each other. This promoted technologi-
cal development in the long run.
Telecommunications regulation is another example. States might allow
(or require) broadband companies to block or filter internet traffic. This may
assist broadband companies' own attempts at innovation, but it can squelch
innovation by third parties. A federal requirement of either network nondis-
crimination or open access to telecommunications facilities decentralizes
innovation so that many different people can create new technologies and
applications that can be layered on top of national telecommunications net-
works. Federal regulation that creates a platform for innovation may benefit
many different states, businesses, and individuals.
Antidiscrimination law also provides a platform for innovation, although
we do not often think of it this way. Jim Crow kept the South backward and
undermined its economic development. It is no accident that port cities and
centers of commerce and immigration also tend to be most tolerant of dif-
ferences. In recent years, cities that have welcomed homosexuals have
benefited from cultural and economic innovation. In these situations a na-
134. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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tional "platform" of tolerance and antidiscrimination can benefit creativity
and innovation as well as civil rights.
These claims are surely controversial. I can think of fairly obvious coun-
terexamples. But the point is that if there is controversy about whether
regulation stifles or promotes innovation, someone has to decide. Congress
is best suited to decide these questions.
G. Lopez and Limits
Is anything beyond Congress's commerce powers? Yes, if Congress can-
not reasonably conclude that an activity presents a federal problem. Note,
however, that Congress may still be able to reach the activity through its
other powers to tax and spend for the general welfare or its powers to en-
force the Reconstruction Amendments.
In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court struck down the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal crime to possess a fire-
arm within 1,000 feet of a school.' Putting aside the Court's reasoning in
Lopez, the result makes some sense. The possession of guns near schools
does not look like a federal problem that produces significant spillover ef-
fects in other states, and Congress, at least at the time it passed the bill, did
not provide any evidence that this activity created a federal problem.16 Gun
possession in or near schools might be a serious problem around the nation,
but one whose dangers individual states would be motivated to address. That
is, it might be a national problem--one that occurs in many states-but not
a federal problem that states are incompetent to address individually.137
The Gun-Free School Zones Act appeared to be legislative grandstand-
ing, a freestanding prohibition unconnected to a larger federal scheme of
regulation of education on the one hand, or gun trafficking on the other.
Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that "[s]ection 922(q) is not an essential
part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory
scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated."'
More correctly put, it was not part of a larger scheme of regulation of inter-
state activity that would be undercut unless intrastate activity were
included.' It follows that Congress may be on surer constitutional footing if
it displaces more state law than if it displaces less. But the apparent paradox
is illusory: the issue is not the amount of federal regulation but rather
whether it is reasonably directed at a federal problem. Lopez therefore
135. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
136. Indeed "[nleither the statute nor its legislative history contain[s] express congressional
findings regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of gun possession in a school zone." Id. at
562 (quoting Brief for United States at 5-6). Congress later provided legislative findings about ef-
fects on interstate and foreign commerce in Section 320904 of the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563 n.4.
137. See the discussion in PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION-
MAKING 621-23 (5th ed. 2006).
138. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
139. See BREST ET AL., supra note 137, at 626.
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makes the most sense if we understand it as announcing an "antigrandstand-
ing" principle. This principle requires that in close cases Congress must
demonstrate a genuine federal problem by detailed findings or else Congress
must make its desired regulation an integral part of a more comprehensive
scheme that does address a genuine federal problem.
The Justices in the Lopez majority, however, did not stop here. Instead,
they offered two new constructions to explain why the Gun-Free School
Zones Act was beyond federal power. Neither is well connected to the struc-
tural purposes of the Commerce Clause.
First, the Court suggested that the federal government could not reach
so-called "traditional" areas of state regulation, including education, crime,
and family law.140 The argument is based on a false premise: the federal gov-
ernment has regulated family law since at least Reconstruction, and it has
regulated education heavily in the last fifty years.14' And of course, the fed-
eral government has attacked crime since the beginning of the Republic and
with increasing frequency in the twentieth century. Perhaps more important,
the argument from tradition is the same argument that was rejected during
the New Deal: The Lochner-era Court viewed manufacturing and labor rela-
tions as traditional areas of state regulation; the Justices eventually realized
that this made little sense in an integrated economy. If an area of concern
has significant spillover effects on other states, or begins to do so, it
shouldn't matter that it was the traditional concern of state regulation.
Education is a good example. The federal government became increas-
ingly interested in educational policy after World War II because conditions
changed; both economic productivity and democracy required a well-
educated workforce. The evolution of an information economy in the late
twentieth century made these requirements all the more important. As trans-
portation networks have improved, so has mobility, and given easy mobility,
some states may increasingly underinvest in education. Poorer and rural
states may not be able to recoup the long-term benefits of a good educa-
tional system because educated persons will leave for large urban areas.
Conversely, people may flock to states with better educational systems, put-
ting strains on their resources and preventing them from delivering quality
services. Because poorly educated people are less able to be productive in
an information economy and participate in an information rich public
140. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564-65; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16
(2000).
141. Kristin A. Collins, Federalism's Fallacy: The Early Tradition of Federal Family Law and
the Invention of States' Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 1761, 1767 (2005) (arguing that prior to the
Civil War, the federal government was actively engaged in creating law concerning family rela-
tions); Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297 (1998)
(arguing that the federal government has been heavily involved in regulating domestic relations
since Reconstruction). Federal regulations of health, safety, and welfare that seek to promote "fam-
ily values" are only the most obvious examples. It is true that the federal government has primarily
used the taxing and spending powers to regulate education and family life. But the question is not
which federal power is being used; it is whether the states have traditionally had more or less exclu-
sive control in the area with no significant history of federal intervention.
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sphere, states with poor educational systems may impoverish not only them-
selves but other states as well.
Crime offers a second example. Much crime presents a national prob-
lem but not necessarily a federal problem. But two varieties are federal
concerns. The first type are crimes that make use of interstate transporta-
tion and communication networks or that cross state lines for their
preparation and execution. An example is the federal power to regulate
wire fraud. The second type are crimes in which the enterprise is organ-
ized in more than one state; states may be less effective in investigating
and prosecuting out-of-state participants and may need federal assistance.
Hence the federal government may reach different varieties of organized
and white collar crime.142 On the other hand, the constitutionality of the Vio-
lence Against Women Act, struck down in United States v. Morrison,'43 is
better defended not in terms of crime that has spillover effects but as Con-
gress's attempt to guarantee women's equal treatment in the justice system.
Despite the Court's remarkably cavalier treatment of the issue, the Violence
Against Women Act is a straightforward application of Congress's powers
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee the equal protec-
tion of the laws.'"
The Lopez Court offered a second construction to justify its decision: it
argued that Congress should not be able to regulate noneconomic activity
even if it cumulatively affected interstate commerce.145 But it should not
matter that air pollution comes from a backyard incinerator or a factory, or
that a migratory bird is shot by a lone hunter or a corporate operative. 146If
noneconomic activity creates a federal problem that states cannot individu-
ally handle, it should fall within the commerce power.147
142. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding federal loan-sharking
statute). The federal government may also have special regulatory competence where weapons or
other dangerous items that are portable, easily concealed, and often used in crime regularly cross
state lines in ways that are hard for individual states to police. Regan, supra note 77, at 569-70.
143. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
144. See Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
The basic idea is that if state and local law enforcements do not take violence against women ser-
ously, they are, quite literally, denying women "the equal protection of the laws." Therefore,
Congress may pass both corrective and prophylactic legislation that directly prohibits gender-
motivated violence by private actors, just as Congress is empowered to protect blacks from racially
motivated violence when local law enforcement looks the other way. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888 397 (1985) ("A
strong argument can be made, on the basis of the origins of the equal protection clause, that private
lynching was among the evils that Congress was meant to have power to forbid."); Laurent B.
Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE
L.J. 1353, 1357, 1377-78 (1964) (explaining that Congress assumed the Fourteenth Amendment
gave it authority to protect blacks from private violence).
145. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; accord Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613.
146. See Regan, supra note 77, at 564.
147. In particular, the notion that ordinary household activity that contributes to pollution or
to other social problems is not economic is particularly ironic. The word "economic" comes from
the word oikos, meaning "household" and nomos, meaning "rules" or "ordering," (or in this case,
"management" or "control"); one of its earliest meanings was household management. See OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). The first economic treatise, Xenophon's Oeconomicus, is a
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There is a far more sensible limiting construction. Instead of asking
whether the activity that produces the spillover effects is "economic," we
should focus instead on whether the spillover has economic effects. Air or
water pollution may not come from a factory or economic enterprise, but the
effects may still cost money to the invaded state. We might sensibly require
that Congress measure the spillover effects in economic terms and not sim-
ply in terms of the degree of moral or ethical disapprobation by individuals
in other states. Moral or ethical objections to how a state handles its re-
sources or governs its populations would not count as a spillover effect; but
economic consequences for other states would. Of course, one can always
cash out moral objections by asking hypothetically how much people in
other states would be willing to pay to persons in the state to stop these ac-
tivities or to adopt different ones, but under the construction suggested here
the possibility of a hypothetical transfer payment does not make the spill-
over effects economic.
The Lopez majority recognized and accepted that in a modem, inte-
grated economy, there will be very few things that the federal government
cannot regulate, especially if it does so through general comprehensive pro-
grams. It also recognized that the federal government can often reach these
subjects through its other powers, like the power to tax and spend for the
general welfare. Thus, despite all the controversy that accompanied the de-
cision, the practical effect of Lopez was very modest: only a very small class
of possible statutes would be beyond Congress's power to enact. For this
reason the doctrinal distinctions that Lopez created did not really further any
of the traditional goals of federalism, whether they be individual liberty,
respect for traditional subjects of state regulation, or local experimentation,
precisely because Congress could regulate the same activities in other ways.
Nevertheless, like other Supreme Courts before it, the Lopez Court
sought a limiting principle to federal commerce power so that it could claim
that the Commerce Clause did not bestow a general federal police power to
regulate on all subjects in any part of the Union. The irony of the decision is
that there is such a structural limiting principle in the text, backed by impec-
cable historical sources. The commerce power does not extend to situations
where Congress cannot reasonably claim to be solving a federal problem.
H. The Individual Mandate for Health Insurance: Lopez or Wickard?
The recent debate over health care reform has revived the debate over
limits on the commerce power. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act features an "individual mandate" that is designed to coax uninsured per-
sons into purchasing health insurance.148
Socratic dialogue about how to manage an estate. The household was the source of production
throughout most of human history and still is the source of the vast majority of budgetary decisions.
148. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. II1- 148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010),
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029
(2010). The individual mandate is § 1501(b) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C § 5000A).
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The term "individual mandate" is misleading for two reasons. First, the
law does not actually require all individuals to purchase insurance. The
mandate does not apply to persons receiving Medicare or Medicaid, military
families, persons living overseas, persons with religious objections, or per-
sons who already get health insurance from their employers under a qualified
plan.14 9 Second, it is not actually a mandate. It is a tax, which people do not
have to pay if they have purchased health insurance. As amended, the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act imposes a penalty tax for each
month that an individual fails to pay premiums into a qualified health plan."0
The tax is part of a comprehensive reform of health insurance that in-
sures more people and prevents them from being denied insurance coverage
because of pre-existing conditions. Successful reform requires that unin-
sured persons-most of whom are younger and healthier than average-join
the national risk pool; this helps lower the costs of health insurance premi-
ums nationally.
The tax gives uninsured people a choice. If they stay out of the risk pool,
they effectively raise other people's insurance costs, and Congress taxes
them to recoup some of the costs. If they join the risk pool, they save the
system money and so they do not have to pay the tax. A good analogy would
be a tax on polluters who fail to install pollution-control equipment: they can
pay the tax or install the equipment.
It is likely that the individual mandate is fully constitutional under Con-
gress's powers under the General Welfare Clause "[tlo lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States.""' The tax clearly pro-
motes the general welfare under existing precedents.'52 Moreover, the tax is
not a direct tax that must be apportioned by state population. 53
Nevertheless, the tax is also constitutional as an exercise of Congress's
commerce power. Congress has two goals in reforming health care: The first
goal is universal coverage-to make health insurance as widely available as
possible. The second goal is "guaranteed issue," which is essentially a re-
quirement of nondiscrimination. Such a rule makes insurance coverage
149. See id. § 1501(b) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. §5000A(d), (e)). Persons listed as depend-
ents on another's tax return are not directly liable for the penalty; however, the taxpayer listing them
as a dependent is responsible for their health care coverage. See 26 U.S.C § 5000A(b)(3)(A).
150. The amount of the penalty is the greater of a flat dollar amount (which is calculated
according to a complicated formula) and a percentage of adjusted gross income which rises to 2.5
percent for taxable years beginning after 2015; this figure, in turn, is capped at the average national
premium. See id. (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(c)(3)).
151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
152. See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate for Health Insur-
ance, 362 NEw ENG. J. MED. 482 (2010); Jack Balkin, The Constitutionality of An Individual
Mandate for Health Insurance, Parts I and II, in David B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee A. Casey, and
Jack M. Balkin, Debate, A Healthy Debate: The Constitutionality of an Individual Mandate, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 93, 102-05, 114-16 (2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/
HealthyDebate.pdf [hereinafter, Balkin, A Healthy Debate].
153. See Balkin, The Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate for Health Insurance, supra
note 152, at 2; Balkin, A Healthy Debate, supra note 152, at 114-16.
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portable when people change jobs, prevents insurance companies from
denying coverage because of pre-existing conditions, and prohibits insur-
ance companies from imposing lifetime caps on insurance or imposing other
arbitrary limitations on health care coverage.
The goals of universal coverage and guaranteed issue are connected be-
cause markets for health insurance face a problem of adverse selection.
Younger and healthier people have incentives to stay out of health insurance
markets, while the elderly and people with greater health care needs have
incentives to stay in. Because the latter are more expensive to insure, ad-
verse selection increases the total cost of insurance for everyone in the pool.
Guaranteed issue requirements exacerbate the difficulty; many people will
wait until they become ill to purchase health insurance, knowing that they
cannot be turned down.
To solve the adverse selection effects and lower insurance costs, health
reform must bring younger and healthier persons into the risk pool. Hence
policymakers must combine nondiscrimination reforms with an individual
mandate.
Does health insurance reform present a regulatory problem where states
are individually incompetent and a national solution is required? Only one
state so far (Massachusetts) has attempted an individual mandate. It is not
difficult to see why. States that unilaterally impose strict guaranteed issue
requirements face obvious collective action problems. People with health
problems will have incentives to move to a state where they cannot be
turned down, raising health care costs for everyone, while insurers will pre-
fer to do business in states where they can avoid more expensive patients
with pre-existing conditions, and younger and healthier people may leave
for jurisdictions where they can avoid paying for health insurance.
If all states imposed an individual mandate, there would be no incentive
for businesses or younger and healthier people to exit and the costs of guar-
anteed issue reforms would be subsidized by a broader risk pool in each
state. But without a guarantee that all states will adopt similar reforms, indi-
vidual states may not want to reform their insurance practices if it means
significantly higher health insurance premiums for their citizens.
For this reason, Congress might reasonably conclude that few states will
be able to adopt guaranteed issue/individual mandate reforms on their own.
Only a national solution can solve the collective action problems that states
face while simultaneously creating a broader risk pool than any individual
state could manage. Thus, the regulatory question is quite similar to those in
Darby and Wickard.
But is the individual mandate a regulation of "commerce"? One objec-
tion to the individual mandate is that it regulates people who don't buy
insurance. They cannot be engaged in commerce if they are literally doing
nothing. In fact, this is not accurate. People who do not buy health insur-
154. Balkin, A Healthy Debate, supra note 152, at 99; Memorandum from Randy Barnett et
al., The Heritage Foundation, Why the Personal Mandate to Buy Health Insurance Is Unprecedented
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ance are actually self-insuring. When they get sick, they rely on their fami-
lies for financial support and they purchase over-the-counter health care
remedies. They also go to emergency rooms where they cannot be turned
away, increasing costs for everyone in their community. Indeed, emergency
room care may be far more expensive than preventative care or care by a
regular physician. These practices involve borrowing, purchasing, and con-
suming goods and services; their cumulative economic effect is substantial,
and they impose significant economic costs on the rest of the country. Be-
cause uninsured persons contribute to a national problem, Congress may
regulate them as part of a national solution.'
IV AN ASIDE ON "NECESSARY AND PROPER"
I have said relatively little about the Necessary and Proper Clause so far
because most contemporary understandings of federal regulatory power can
be justified without it. The interaction theory derives Congress's foreign and
domestic powers directly from the original meaning of the Clause coupled
with basic structural principles. Under the trade or economic theories, how-
ever, one might need the Necessary and Proper Clause to explain why
Congress can reach nontrade or noneconomic activity that affects trade or
economic activity, respectively. Because Congress has the power to make its
and Unconstitutional (Dec. 9, 2009), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/legalissues/
Im0049.cfm.
155. Under current doctrine, Congress may regulate economic activity that has a cumulative
and substantial effect on interstate commerce. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 117 (1942); United
States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 121-22 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 118-24 (1941). Congress may also regulate local behavior when doing so is "an essential part
of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless
the intrastate activity were regulated." Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24 (2005) (quoting United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)). Indeed, as Justice Scalia has explained, under the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause "Congress may regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation
is a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce." Id. at 37 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in the judgment).
The constitutionality of the individual mandate is a straightforward application of Wickard and
Raich. In Wickard, the Supreme Court held that Congress could regulate wheat grown for home
consumption as part of a more general regulation of farm production. People who grew wheat at
home substituted it for wheat products they would otherwise purchase in the market; cumulatively,
this practice had a substantial effect on interstate farm prices and undermined Congress's regulation
of farm production. In Gonzales v. Raich, the Court held that Congress could regulate marijuana
grown for home consumption as part of a general ban on controlled substances, because Congress
reasonably concluded that people would substitute homegrown marijuana for other marijuana pur-
chased in black markets, and this would undermine Congress's more general regulation of
controlled substances.
As noted in the text, uninsured persons actually self-insure; they rely on their families for finan-
cial support, go to emergency rooms (often passing costs on to others), or purchase over-the-counter
remedies. They substitute these activities for paying premiums to health insurance companies. All these
activities are economic, and they have a cumulative effect on interstate commerce. Moreover, like
people who substitute homegrown marijuana or wheat for purchased crops, the cumulative effect of
uninsured people's behavior undermines Congress's regulation-in this case, its regulation of health
insurance markets. Because Congress believes that national health care reform will not succeed unless
these people are brought into national risk pools, it can regulate their activities in order to make its
general regulation of health insurance effective.
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regulations of commerce effective, the argument goes, it may reach at least
some activity that is neither trade nor economic activity.
Much ink has been spilled on the meaning of "necessary" and to what
extent it limits federal regulatory power. Does "necessary" mean "absolutely
required" or "indispensable," or does it mean "convenient" or "designed to
achieve a particular end," as Alexander Hamilton and Chief Justice John
Marshall maintained? The answer becomes clear when we look at the text of
the entire Clause: "The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the forego-
ing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States or in any Department or Officer thereof."'
Most writers have focused on what we might call the "vertical" aspect of
the Clause: laws that affect the interests of states. But an equally important
function of the clause is its "horizontal" aspect. It empowers Congress to
organize the executive and judicial branches to carry out federal governmen-
tal functions.57
The power to create new cabinet departments and organize or reorganize
existing ones, for example, comes from Congress's powers "[tlo make all
Laws . . . for carrying into Execution" the "Powers vested ... in the Gov-
ernment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."'
This horizontal aspect of the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress
the power to shape the structure and organization of coordinate branches of
the federal government. 9
Congress has used its horizontal powers under the Necessary and Proper
Clause throughout the nation's history. For example, Congress created the
Department of Justice in 1870 to administer and prosecute federal laws fol-
lowing the Civil War. Following World War II, it merged the Departments of
the Army and Navy into the Department of Defense and created the Central
Intelligence Agency and the National Security Council in the National Secu-
156. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
157. See AMAR, supra note 17, at 110-11. The idea of the clause's "horizontal" effect comes
from William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the Presi-
dent and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, 40
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 102 (1976).
158. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
159. In United States v. Comstock, the Supreme Court held that Congress had the power to
create a civil commitment procedure for mentally ill sexually dangerous federal prisoners beyond
the date they would otherwise be released. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. - (2010). Justice
Breyer's majority opinion held that the test is "whether a statute constitutes a means that is ration-
ally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power." Id. at 6. Comstock is a
good example of the basic principle behind Congress's Article 1, Section 8 powers. Comstock pre-
sents a classic collective action issue, a NIMBY (not in my back yard) problem. As Justice Alito
puts it, "The statute recognizes that, in many cases, no State will assume the heavy financial burden
of civilly committing a dangerous federal prisoner who, as a result of lengthy federal incarceration,
no longer has any substantial ties to any State." Id. at I (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
Without a federal solution, states will attempt to deny responsibility for dangerous mentally ill sex
offenders, hoping that some other state will assume the costs. Hence a federal solution becomes
appropriate. See Jack M. Balkin, Comstock, Health Care Reform, and Federalism, BALKINIZATION,
May 17, 2010, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/05/comstock-health-care-reform-and.html.
48 [Vol. 109:1
rity Act of 1947. It combined various federal programs and agencies into a
Department of Health Education and Welfare in 1953 and later split it into a
Department of Education (created in 1979) and a Department of Health and
Human Services (officially renamed in 1980). It created a Department of
Homeland Security in 2002 following the September 11, 2001, terrorist at-
tacks. And of course, within each department Congress has created and
modified various offices and agencies, and assigned to each its respective
duties, jurisdictions, and obligations.
According to the text of the Constitution each creation or reorganization
of these federal departments had to be "necessary and proper" for carrying
out powers granted to the federal government. But was each of them indis-
pensable to "carry[] into execution" the Constitution's enumerated powers?
Obviously not. Nor could we always say that these laws were always the
most efficient, most straightforward, or most direct means of exercising fed-
eral powers. Rather, in each case Congress simply judged the legislation a
convenient or appropriate way of organizing the executive branch. That is all
that the word "necessary" requires.
If "necessary" only means "convenient" or "designed to achieve a par-
ticular end" when Congress regulates horizontally, i.e., when it creates laws
that affect the other branches, it means the same thing when it regulates ver-
tically, i.e., when it creates laws that affect the interests of the states. There
is, after all, only one Necessary and Proper Clause. In fact, the bill creating
the Second Bank of the United States upheld in McCulloch v. Maryland'
had both horizontal and vertical aspects. It created a new federal agency
(with a mixture of public and private ownership and control) and the agency
affected state banks and state economic activities.
The word "proper" is equally important to understanding the scope of
the Necessary and Proper Clause. A regulation is "proper" if it is consistent
with the Constitution, including its underlying structural principles. An oth-
erwise convenient law might not be proper, for example, because it violates
individual rights protected by the Constitution. An otherwise convenient law
might not be proper because it violates the Tenth Amendment, which, as we
have seen, is just the flip side of the structural principle in Resolution VI.
(For example, the law might not seek to solve a genuine federal problem but
merely be an exercise in congressional grandstanding.) Finally, a law might
not be proper because it violates the separation of powers or undermines
important checks and balances between the different branches.
V. CONSTRUCTION AND CHANGE
The original meaning of the Commerce Clause is consistent with the
modem activist state and gives the federal government wide latitude to pass
civil rights, employment, consumer protection, health, and environmental
laws. Courts, however, have read it far more narrowly for much of the nation's
history. Original meaning did not compel them to do so. Judicial doctrines
160. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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were constructions designed to implement the constitutional text and underly-
ing structural principles. These doctrines were premised on assumptions about
economic and social life in the early nineteenth century that were not sustain-
able as national markets developed and transportation and communications
networks expanded. There is nothing surprising about this: constitutional con-
structions are always attempts at implementation-often imperfect and
provisional-premised on background assumptions about social and political
life. When those assumptions prove outmoded or unreasonable, fidelity to text
and principle not only allows but requires that we abandon older constructions
and replace them with new ones.
Nineteenth century courts sought to preserve a distinction between na-
tional and local power by making distinctions between national and local
subjects of regulation, and they created a series of doctrinal structures to
accomplish this goal. These included distinctions between commerce and
agriculture or manufacturing and between direct and indirect effects on
commerce. Thus, as noted earlier, the trade theory is less an adequate ac-
count of original meaning than a construction designed to demarcate
separate spheres of federal and state power. Ironically, it achieves this goal
by defining "commerce" narrowly-with predictable problems for Con-
gress's powers to regulate foreign and Indian affairs-when the real point of
these distinctions was to narrowly define what commerce was "among the
several states" and therefore subject to federal regulation.
Lawyers often associate these distinctions with the Lochner-era Court
that sat between 1897 and 1937, but they actually date from a bit earlier in
the nineteenth century. They grow out of John Marshall's dicta about state
inspection laws in Gibbons v. Ogden, and they were developed in a series of
cases that gave the states freer rein to regulate in areas that the federal gov-
ernment was unlikely to enter.161 Courts continued to employ these
constructions in an era increasingly ill-suited for them, sometimes adding
various workarounds-for example, to permit federal regulation of new
transportation technologies like trains.
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, people well under-
stood that many activities, including noneconomic activities, could affect
more than one state, particularly if they used interstate networks of transpor-
tation and communication. But the lack of a truly integrated national society
and economy meant that these spillover effects were likely not to be signifi-
cant in most cases. Travel between different parts of the Union was often
difficult and sometimes even dangerous. In a nonintegrated society and
economy, spillover effects between states might often be attenuated. More-
161. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824) (inspection laws "act upon the
subject before it becomes an article of ... commerce ... and prepare it for that purpose. . . . No
direct general power over these objects is granted to Congress"); Veazie v. Young, 55 U.S. 568, 573-
74 (1852) (holding that regulation of commerce does not include regulation of manufactures and
agriculture); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1877) ("Commerce has nothing to do with
land while producing, but only with the product after it has become the subject of trade."); JAMES
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 436 (John M. Gould ed., 14th ed. 1896) (noting that
commerce does not include preparation of articles for export); Gillman, supra note 71, at 421-22.
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over, the structural principle behind enumerated powers was double sided; it
assumed that states would have regulatory authority in cases where federal
solutions were not needed. Hence it made sense for politicians and judges to
argue for constructions that would act as rules of thumb to divide up the
realm of state and federal regulatory power.
Although many of the nineteenth century constructions purported to de-
fine "commerce," they were really ways of articulating and implementing
what commerce was "among the several states;" that is, situations that pre-
sented a federal problem that required a federal solution. Where foreign
nations and the Indian tribes were concerned, the problem was presump-
tively federal, and so courts usually gave Congress fairly wide latitude. But
where domestic legislation was concerned, the distinction between direct
and indirect effects, or between commerce, manufacturing, and agriculture,
arguably had a heuristic or functional justification. They helped maintain a
rough albeit imperfect division between activities that might have significant
spillover effects or create significant collective action problems and activi-
ties that did not.
Nevertheless, these nineteenth-century constructions became increas-
ingly unrealistic as the twentieth century proceeded. The problems began
years earlier when telegraphs and railroads began to connect previously iso-
lated parts of the country, later abetted by automobiles, trucks, and
airplanes. As the industrial revolution took off and telecommunications and
transportation networks grew, spillover effects multiplied. Courts responded
by creating an elaborate series of cross cutting doctrines, distinctions, and
subdistinctions to get around the straitjacket imposed by these early nine-
teenth-century constructions.
By the early twentieth century, this doctrinal structure had lost most of
its usefulness. Distinctions between manufacturing, agriculture, and com-
merce, or between direct and indirect effects, no longer served the function
of implementing the structural principle of Resolution VI and demarcating
areas where intrastate activities had few spillover effects. Instead, in a
changed world, these older constructions frustrated the Constitution's pur-
poses by limiting federal power in arbitrary ways. In this context, the
structural principle behind the doctrine of enumerated powers justified re-
placing older constructions with newer ones. These changes inevitably
meant a much greater potential federal power to regulate private intrastate
activity. But that is the consequence of applying an abstract text and an ab-
stract principle to profoundly changed circumstances. The generation of
1787 would never have dreamed of a federal government as powerful as the
one we have today. But they lived in a different world. Although we must
remain faithful to the original meaning of the constitutional text, we are not
bound by the Framers' expected applications of text and principle.
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